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Can antidiscrimination laws punish hostile work environ-
ment harassment without infringing freedom of speech and ex-
pression? Consider the following examples of nude pictures dis-
played in different workplaces. 
Joan is the only woman welder at a shipyard. Her coworkers 
have posted sexually explicit centerfolds, calendars, and cartoon 
depictions of nude women from Playboy, Hustler, and similar 
magazines throughout common areas-the break room, the 
cafeteria, the halls, and the equipment room.' Some of the post-
ers could be construed as political statements about the proper 
role of women: In one of the photos, a woman wears just an 
apron; in another, a woman wears a skimpy nurse's outfit. The 
pictures unnerve Joan, and she asks her supervisors to have the 
pictures removed. They tell her she's nuts if she thinks men in a 
shipyard will take down their girlie pictures. Get used to it, they 
tell her. She sues, alleging that the pictures have created a sexu-
ally hostile work environment. 
The Museum of Modern Art is running an exhibition on 
"Playboy: Transforming the Body in American Society," which 
features enlarged versions of Playboy centerfolds to document 
changes in American visions of female beauty. A woman secu-
rity guard objects to being assigned to the gallery in which this 
exhibition is being held. MoMA refuses to reassign her, and she 
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sues, alleging that the pictures have created a hostile work envi-
ronment. 
Librarians have sued the Minneapolis Public Library for 
failing to correct a hostile work environment. The librarians 
claim that male patrons have been using the library's Internet 
kiosks to surf pornography sites. The librarians can see the com-
puter screens from the reference desk. At least once a day, they 
see raunchy pictures of various sex acts (and those are the tame 
ones). Often, the patrons use the library's color printers to print 
these pictures, but then forget to retrieve them. When the li-
brarians clean out old print jobs, they see these images. The li-
brarians must also enforce time limits on Internet use; some-
times patrons will react aggressively when the librarians ask 
them to relinquish a computer. One patron yelled at a librarian, 
and another threw a chair across the room after being asked to 
sign off. The librarians have complained to the directors of the 
library. The library directors have been unwilling to install 
Internet filters, claiming that the First Amendment prevents 
them from doing so. Disgusted, the librarians have filed a com-
plaint with the EEOC. 
In each of these examples, the meaning of the expression 
changes in each of the three workplaces- though the surface 
content of the depictions is the same. These examples suggest 
that our reaction to whether expression should properly form 
the basis of a harassment claim has less to do with what is said or 
displayed than with the context in which the words are uttered 
or the images are displayed. I advance that thesis here. 
Part I argues that the First Amendment status of expression 
in the workplace is determined by context, not by bright-line 
rules. Workplaces have varying missions, and a workplace's mis-
sion affects how workers encounter expression. The social bene-
fits of expression and the social costs of regulating it are also af-
fected by a workplace's mission. 
Some workplaces are organized primarily to make money 
by designing, making, or selling a product or providing some ser-
vice. Any expressive aspects of the product or service (the 
Volkswagen Bug's evocation of nostalgia) are directed towards 
something other than thought, deliberation, or debate among 
consumers of the product or service. A few examples would be 
food, clothing, or car retailers, manufacturers, pharmaceutical 
companies, construction companies, and accounting firms. 
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Other workplaces have a communicative or expressive mis-
sion. They are organized around the purpose of communicating 
an idea or message, sparking conversation, argument, or thought 
among patrons, or providing a place for patrons to engage in 
conversation. A "communicative workplace," in other words, 
produces or supports the production of expression that is itself 
ordinarii¥ protected bi' the First Amendment. Museums and art 
galleries, newspapers and magazines,4 and concert halls5 would 
all be communicative workplaces. In Part I, I argue that some 
expression in communicative workplaces may merit different 
treatment under the First Amendment because it contributes to 
public discourse. 
All workplaces do some business through expression that 
does not implicate First Amendment values, and communicative 
workplaces are no exception. These non-discursive aspects of all 
workplaces explain why no employer-not a museum, not a 
newspaper6 -could claim First Amendment protection against 
an employee's breach of contract suit. These aspects of all busi-
nesses also explain why a museum guard suing for harassment 
over pornography in the employees' lunchroom should be 
treated differently from a guard who sues over the same pictures 
displayed in the museum gallery as part of an exhibit. 
Generally, harassment claims arising out of direct commu-
nications between supervisors and subordinates pose little if any 
First Amendment problem, whether they arise in communicative 
or ordinary workplaces. The same is true for harassment claims 
based on direct interactions among coworkers. Environmental 
harassment claims or claims based on harassment by a business's 
customers may engender greater First Amendment worries 
when the customers are engaging in or responding to First 
Amendment activities within the realm of public discourse. The 
First Amendment would (and should) prohibit a museum em-
ployee's hostile work environment suit based on patrons' taste-
less comments about an exhibit. Within the realm of public dis-
course, the First Amendment requires government regulations 
2. See, e.g., Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Scis. v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 
197-99 (E.D. N.Y. 1999). 
3. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
4. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,56 (1c;88). 
5. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789·90 (1989) (subjecting vol· 
ume limits on a concert to First Amendment scrutiny). 
6. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663,665 (1991) (holding that the First 
Amendment did not exempt a newspaper from liability under generally applicable laws 
for breach of contract). 
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on expression to be neutral about substantive issues, including 
race and sex equality. Within ordinary workplaces, however, the 
law should strike a different balance between expression and 
equality. Most employee speech within ordinary workplaces has 
only a marginal relationship to public discourse. The govern-
ment's interest in ensuring equal opportunity in ordinary work-
places generally outweighs employees' interests in engaging in 
unfettered debate at work. 
My contextual approach is open to the criticism that allow-
ing First Amendment protection to hinge on something as 
amorphous as "contextual meaning" could discourage a good 
deal of speech because people fear coming too close to the line 
between protected and punishable speech. Part II will refute the 
"chill" argument. The First Amendment is just not about bright-
line rules. Bright-line rules play an important role only with re-
gard to a tiny amount of expression and their importance is 
overstated even there. Courts routinely deploy "reasonable per-
son" standards and analyze the meaning of statements in context 
in defamation and other dignitary tort cases-even when un-
questionably political, nationally published speech is at issue. 
Hostile environment's standards closely resemble those of other 
dignitary torts. Moreover, the chill argument assumes that all 
employers have the same incentives to avoid hostile work envi-
ronment liability by stifling potentially offensive speech by em-
ployees and customers. This assumption is overly simplistic. Or-
ganizations that participate in, promote, or support public 
discourse have few incentives to adopt policies unfriendly to 
speech. 
I. HOW DOES WORKPLACE CONTEXT AFFECT THE 
CHARACTER OF "SPEECH" UNDER THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT? 
"Speech" in the First Amendment context is a term of art 
that has both a broader and narrower meaning than when used 
conversationally.7 It is broader because it encompasses more 
than verbal conduct. Pictures and symbols, not just words, are 
protected,8 as well as some expressi~e conduct such as the wear-
ing of an armband and flag burning. 
7. Frederick Schauer, The Speech-ing of Sexual Harassment, in MacKinnon and 
Siegel, eds., Directions in Sexual Harassment Law at 547-48 (2003) (forthcoming) (manu-
script on file with author). 
8. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) ("The First Amendment literally 
forbids the abridgment only of 'speech,' but we have long recognized that its protection 
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"Speech" also has a narrower meaning than it does in ordi-
nary usage. 10 Words used to contract fall within the category of 
"verbal actions" known as "performatives." Performatives are 
utterances or writings that do not describe, report, or assert 
something and are not falsifiable. The words are part of some ac-
tion that itself would not be described as "saying" something. 11 
Speech is a performative when to say something is to do some-
thing beyond the act of uttering the words themselves. 12 Other 
such examples of verbal actions include the vow to marry and a 
will that bequeaths an estate. The First Amendment protects 
none of these verbal "actions." 
The range of utterances, writings, and depictions that the 
government may freely regulate is not limited to performatives. 
We often perceive regulable utterances, writings, and depictions 
as action rather than as speech, much in the same way that we 
see performatives as doing, not merely saying, something. In-
citement, graffiti on private property, and product warning and 
content labels, are all examples of this sort of non-performative 
but regulable utterance. 13 Indeed, First Amendment speech 
could be characterized as the exception to the more general rule 
that "linguistic behavior-speech in the ordinary language 
sense-is subject to control on the same standards as is any other 
behavior." 14 At the very least, "for a vast range of verbal, linguis-
tic, or pictorial conduct" the First Amendment is just not "part 
of the picture." 15 
does not end at the spoken or written word."); American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hud-
nut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (recognizing generally that 
nonverbal expression, such as pornographic pictures, is protected by the First Amend-
ment). 
9. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (stating that 
wearing an armband is speech); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (stating that !lag 
burning is speech). 
10. Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language 58 (Oxford U. 
Press, 1989) ( stating that "situation-altering" utterances like agreements, promises, or-
ders, and manipulative threats "are outside the scope of a principle of free speech," be-
cause they "are ways of doing things, not of asserting things, and they are generally sub-
ject to regulation on the same bases as most noncommunicative behavior"); Schauer, 
Speech-ing at 2 (cited in note 7) (explaining "the domain of application of the First 
Amendment ... is not coextensive with the forms of behavior that would count as 
'speech' in ordinary non-technical English"). 
II. J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words 6, 12-13 (Harvard U. Press, 1962). 
12. ld. at 12-13. 
13. Sec Schauer, Speech-ing at 4 (cited in note 7). 
14. !d. at 5 (footnote omitted). 
15. ld. at 605; see also Robert Post, Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment, in 
MacKinnon and Siegel, eds., Directions in Sexual Harassment Law 3 (2002) (forthcom-
ing) (noting that "the First Amendment does not even attempt to protect all of the 
'communication' that occurs through the explicit usc of words and language"). 
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A. WORK'S INEVITABLE ECONOMIC SPHERE 
All employment relations involve some expression that 
does not and should not receive First Amendment scrutiny. Em-
ployment contracts, disclosures of safety conditions, and union-
management interactions are all highly regulated. But regula-
tions of these utterances and writings at work do not strike us as 
regulations of "speech," because, in each case, the speech being 
regulated is instrumental to accomplishing some end that is not 
itself protected by the First Amendment. 
When we speak of workplace harassment, we easily forget 
that the cause of action arises from more general employment 
discrimination statutes that regulate an economic relationship 
between employers and employees. Title VII, the ADA, the 
ADEA, and parallel state laws prohibit employers from making 
employment decisions based on race, sex, national origin, color, 
religion, disability, and age. They also prohibit employers from 
using these characteristics to impose discriminatory terms and 
conditions of employment or to segregate workplaces. These 
laws require, in other words, that an employer ignore character-
istics that he personally might find highly salient, so long as the 
employee is the "best qualified" worker. 
All workplaces share an important characteristic. All are in-
strumental organizations; that is, they are created and operated 
to achieve some goal. Of course, different workplaces are consti-
tuted to achieve different goals. This point is obvious: workers at 
the St. Paul Ford Explorer plant are organized to make SUVs, 
and they combine their energies to make these behemoths. 
Other organizations are defined by an ideological mission or 
message. The organization's ideological mission or message, 
however, does not change the fact that it is also an instrumental 
organization. 16 The League of Women Voters, for example, 
dedicates itself to promoting voting, regardless of a voter's af-
filiation. The League avoids partisan activities, and it encourages 
its members to provide fora for debates among candidates of all 
parties. The National Abortion Rights Action League is quite 
similar. It hires people to solicit funds to support abortion rights, 
and it pays lobbyists to voice particular positions about certain 
state and federal initiatives. NARAL would certainly fire a can-
vasser who toed a pro-life line when soliciting funds or a lobbyist 
16. See Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and 
Theory of the Public Forum, 34 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1713, 1768-70 (1987) (explaining how 
speech in workplaces is organized toward a specific end). 
2002] CERTAIN ILLUSIONS ABOUT SPEECH 397 
who encouraged members of Congress to support legislation 
that limited abortions. 
Work's instrumental nature pervades interactions among 
coworkers, supervisors, and subordinates, whether a workplace's 
mission is like NARAL's or is oriented toward producing a good 
or service outside of the First Amendment's ambit. The inevita-
ble instrumental aspects of work, along with the responsibility to 
get work done, color how we interpret events in the workplace. 
Were we to come across a commode in the hallway of our work-
place, we would suppose a plumber had forgotten to finish fixing 
the restroom. In the gallery of a museum, we would see the same 
commode as "art." 17 If an employer calls a meeting to speculate 
about the dire effects of proposed unionization, the employer's 
remarks seem more threatening18 than if the employer specu-
lates on The News Hour. 
The Court has often countenanced federal regulation of 
both employer and employee speech in the labor context and re-
strictions on expression in government workplaces. These deci-
sions demonstrate two points. First, at least some expression in 
all workplaces lies beyond the First Amendment, because the 
expression accomplishes some end that does not implicate First 
Amendment values. Second, workplace expression has an eco-
nomic cost, and the government may legitimately regulate ex-
pression in the workplace to prevent economic disruption. Both 
of these points affect whether the First Amendment permits 
government to impose liability on employers for hostile work 
environment harassment. 
Discriminatory workplace harassment harms its targets 
economically. Harassment increases the cost of work by subject-
ing "members of one [group] ... to disadvantageous terms or 
conditions of employment,"1 thus making "it more difficult" for 
members of that group "to do the job. "20 In this respect, harass-
17. See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 
1249, 1253-54 (1995). Post argues that the Duehamp urinal is transformed from bathroom 
appliance to art entitled "The Fountain," "because artists and spectators share conven-
tions that establish the medium of art exhibitions, and these conventions can by them-
selves generate forms of human interaction that are acknowledged as 'ideas' within the 
jurisprudence of the First Amendment." This is true for museum workers, too. The 
commode in the back hallway is an accident or obstruction. The commode in the gallery 
IS art. Though we can argue whether it is really "art," that fact itself perhaps proves it is. 
18. See NLRB v. Gisse/ Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616-19 (1969) (upholding the 
NLRB's restrictions on an employer's comments about the potential harms of unioniza-
tion as consistent with the First Amendment). 
19. Oncale v. Sundvwner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
20. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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ment law's restrictions on workplace expression resemble other 
regulations of workplace expression that are designed to prevent 
or limit economic disruption.21 That the cost of harassment is 
caused by expression may matter in some cases. By itself, how-
ever, the fact that expression causes the economic harm does not 
imply First Amendment protection for that expression any more 
than does a scam artist's fraudulent pitch. 
B. WHY ISN'T QUID PRO QUO HARASSMENT PROTECTED 
SPEECH? 
Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws generally punish 
two types of workplace harassment. The first is quid pro quo 
harassment, in which a supervisor (or someone with similar 
powers) explicitly or implicitly threatens to fire an employee or 
withhold some job benefit if the employee does not consent to 
sexual conduct, and the supervisor carries out that threat (either 
by withholding some job benefit or by exacting acquiescence to 
sexual demands). 22 
The second is hostile work environment harassment. Hos-
tile work environment harassment does not involve threats car-
ried out, implicit or otherwise. It occurs when-through conduct 
or speech-a supervisor, coworker, or a third party (such as a 
client of the employer) harasses another because of a prohibited 
characteristic.23 The harassment has to be severe enough to "al-
ter the terms or conditions" of the victim's work environment.24 
A plaintiff can, in some cases, claim that she is subjected to a 
hostile work environment even when she is not insulted or de-
meaned directly, if the work environment is permeated with in-
sulting or demeaning gender- or race-based conduct or expres-
sion. 
21. Of course it is wrong to say that the government can, consistent with the First 
Amendment, pass a law that requires employers to restrict their employees' expression 
just because the government, acting as employer, may permissibly fire an employee for 
expressive conduct that seriously disrupts a governmental workplace. My point here is 
much narrower: The Court's reasons for permitting restrictions on government employ-
ees' speech partially explain why a cause of action for hostile work environment harass-
ment generally poses few First Amendment problems. 
22. Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998) ("Cases based on 
threats which are carried out are referred to often as quid pro quo cases, as distinct from 
bothersome attentions or sexual remarks that are sufficiently severe or pervasive to cre-
ate a hostile work environment."). 
23. Id. 
24. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) (holding that com-
ments, conduct, or requests for sexual favors must be severe or pervasive enough to alter 
the terms and conditions of work environment both in the plaintiff's eyes and in the eyes 
of a reasonable person). 
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Employers are not automatically liable for all forms of har-
assment of their employees. When supervisors harass their sub-
ordinates, Title VII will not hold employers vicariously liable for 
hostile work environment harassment if the employer provided 
adequate measures to prevent and remedJ harassment and the 
victim failed to take advantage of them. 5 Harassment of em-
ployees by coworkers or other third parties, such as an em-
ployer's customers, is treated differently. In those cases, Title 
VII holds employers liable for such harassment if the employer 
knew or should have known about the harassment but failed to 
prevent or correct it.26 This standard comes from the common 
law principle that a master may be liable for negligently failing 
to protect servants from torts.27 "Environmental harassment" 
cases most often fall into the second category because they usu-
ally involve claims that coworkers or third parties have created 
the hostile work environment. 
No one who has criticized sexual harassment law on free 
speech grounds has ever claimed that the First Amendment pro-
hibits the government from barring quid pro quo harassment. 
This fact is interesting because quid pro quo harassment is, as a 
formal matter, perpetrated by "speech"-verbal or written 
threats to withhold job benefits. Critics of the hostile work envi-
ronment cause of action quickly concede that threats are not 
"speech" under the First Amendment28 because they are "per-
formatives. "29 
This concession significantly complicates, and ultimately 
undermines, the First Amendment attack on hostile work envi-
ronment liability. The difference between regulable performa-
tives and protected "speech" is neither sharp nor logically de-
rived. The difference is a function of social context.30 The same 
statement can be a performative in one context but "speech" in 
another. If I say, "I'd really like a steak," to my companion while 
we are marooned on a desert island, I am wistfully describing a 
desire unlikely to be fulfilled. If I say it to a waiter, I make a con-
25. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,765 (1998). 
26. Id. at 758-59. 
27. See Restatement (2d) of Agency§ 213(d). 
28. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Har-
assment, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1791, 1800 (1992) (stating that "quid pro quo harass-
ment ... would seemingly be as unprotected by the First Amendment as any other form 
of threat or extortion"). 
29. Schauer, Speech-ing at 663 (cited in note 7). 
30. Post, Sexual Harassment and the Firs£ Amendment at 604 (cited in note 15) (ar-
guing that constitutional treatment of superficially identical communication depends on 
"the social matrix within which meaning is embedded"). 
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tract by accepting the restaurant's implicit offer to sell a particu-
lar cut of meat, as described on the menu and at the listed price. 
At a political rally, I might refer to the state of the American 
economy (remember Mondale's "Where's the beef"?). 
These are not unique examples. The Ninth Circuit closely 
divided over whether "Wanted" and "Guilty" posters featuring 
the names, pictures, and whereabouts of several abortion pro-
viders were actual, unlawful threats or political advocacy.31 
Cases like this one are difficult, because often nothing about the 
utterance itself-not the syntax, the punctuation, or the word 
use- distinguishes protected, golitical speech from verbal ac-
tions and regulable utterances. The distinction between threats 
and political bluster depends on conventions that are often only 
implicitly understood-the cultural understandings of the people 
who are communicating, where the exchange takes place, the re-
lationship between the parties, and the intended purpose of the 
words. 33 Think of a protester at a peace rally who waves the 
banner: "George W. Bush: WANTED for Crimes against the 
People of Iraq." We know instinctively that she has made a pro-
tected, political statement about the war in Iraq, not put a 
bounty on the President's head. In form, this poster's message 
mimics the "Guilty" posters that the Ninth Circuit held to be 
true threats. Both posters identify a particular person and that 
31. Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life 
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en bane) (splitting 6-5 over whether a reasonable 
person would perceive "Guilty" posters as making a true threat), vacating Planned Par-
enthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001) (2-1 deci-
sion) (holding that the posters were protected political advocacy, not punishable threats). 
32. Austin, How to Do Things With Words at 11, 53-66 (cited in note 11) (explain-
ing how the distinction between performative and constative utterances cannot be satis-
factorily reduced to grammatical and syntactical differences); see also RA V v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377,385 (1992) (explaining that fighting words are not necessarily devoid 
of expressive content; •·sometimes they are quite expressive indeed"); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569, 573-74 (1942) (rinding that arguably political statements-
saying the marshal was "a God damned racketeer" and a "damned Fascist and the whole 
government or Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists" -nonetheless consisted of 
unprotected fighting words). 
33. Austin, How to Do Things With Words at 26-32 (cited in note 11) (describing 
performatives as dependent on "an accepted conventional procedure having a certain 
conventional effect, the procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain per-
sons in certain circumstances.") See also, e.g., United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1072 
(8th Cir. 2000) (finding defendant's placement of a Ryder truck in the driveway of an 
abortion clinic was a threat because after the Oklahoma City bombing, a reasonable per-
son would perceive the truck as expressing the intent to harm workers in the clinic); Rice 
v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 249 (4th Cir. 1997) (denying summary judgment based 
on a First Amendment defense by the publisher of a murder for hire book used by a 
hired killer because the book gave detailed, precise instructions, the publisher stipulated 
that it intended it to help criminals commit crimes, and the book contained "not even a 
hint" that the author was engaging in "abstract advocacy"). 
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person's "crime." The president, however, is often the subject of 
impassioned hyperbole-Robert Watts was neither the first nor 
the last to wish a president dead.34 Identifying the president does 
not really single him out, but identifying an otherwise anony-
mous abortion doctor does. Remove the particular doctors' 
names from the "Guilty" posters, so that they read, "Abortion 
Doctors: WANTED for MURDER!", and they become pro-
tected speech.35 Performatives, in short, are dependent on cul-
tural norms and contextual clues for their meaning. 
Courts sift through many contextual factors to determine 
whether government may regulate some statement or expression 
as a threat or solicitation, or whether it is protected speech. 
These factors include whether expression is targeted to a specific 
person or to a group, whether it is communicated in public 
rather than in private, whether the speaker has authority to di-
rect the actions of the listeners, and whether the expression 
urges some specific purpose or more general goals.36 
Verbal interactions between supervisors and subordinates 
and among coworkers often share many of the characteristics of 
unprotected speech. Expression among workers is often targeted 
to a specific person or to small, identifiable groups of people; in-
teractions take place in a quasi-private space not generally open 
to the public; and often a speaker at work has authority to direct 
the actions of those addressed, or at least to affect another's abil-
ity to perform his job. A supervisor or coworker's threatening 
remarks are more likely to be taken seriously rather than lightly 
dismissed as "popping off." 
Two propositions follow from this observation. First, when 
people engage in expression at work they generally expect their 
discussions with their bosses and coworkers to have an "instru-
34. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 705-06 (1969) (per curiam) (holding as 
a matter of law that defendant's statement, "If they ever make me carry a rifle the first 
man I want to get in my sights is L. B. J." was political hyperbole); Rankin v. McPherson, 
483 U.S. 378 (1987) (a clerk in the constable's office wished that the next person who 
tried to shoot President Reagan would "get him"); sec also Planned Parenthood, 290 
F.3d at 1072 (observing that the Supreme Court in Watts v. United States had "considered 
context and determined that Watts's statement was political hyperbole instead of a true 
threat"). 
35. See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1078-80 (relying on the fact that "Guilty" 
posters and the Nuremberg Files web page identified particular abortion doctors in find-
ing that they were true threats). 
36. See Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language at 228-29, 232-33, 
243-45, 249-52 (cited in note 10); cf. Frederick F. Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First 
Amendment: An Essay in Memory of Harry Canter, 64 Va. L. Rev. 263, 266 (1978) (not-
ing that the truth or falsity of an allegedly defamatory statement "must turn on the use of 
language" and on whether the speaker "violates society's linguistic conventions"). 
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mental" overlay-that is, they expect their conversations at work 
to be about work or, at least indirectly, to affect their work. Sec-
ond, most discussions and interactions within the workplace can, 
in fact, affect a worker's productivity and make it harder for her 
to do her job. 
If these propositions are true, then the reasons for not insu-
lating quid pro quo harassment from liability imply that hostile 
work environment harassment should not be protected either, 
with one caveat. It is possible that expression claimed to create a 
hostile work environment might contribute to public discourse in 
a way that quid pro quo demands do not. If that is true in a par-
ticular case, that may be a reason to protect the expression un-
der the First Amendment. 
The Court has taken these two propositions about work-
place speech for granted when it has reviewed restrictions on 
government employees' expression37 and restrictions on em-
ployer speech in the labor relations context.38 These assumptions 
have thus shaped the boundaries of appropriate employee ex-
pression at work and permissible disciplinary responses by em-
ployers. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Company/9 for example, the 
Court relied on these factors to create a very broad definition of 
unlawful threats of reprisal against employees seeking to union-
ize. Gissel held that an employer's statements about the poten-
tially damaging effects of unionization were unlawful threats 
unless they were based on "objective fact[s]" about the "demon-
strably probable consequences" of unionization or unless they 
"convey[ ed] a management decision already arrived at to close 
the plant in case of unionization."40 In other words, an employer 
must be able to prove its predictions about the effects of unioni-
zation before it can worry aloud to its employees. Undocu-
mented, idle predictions are threats. 
The Court defined threats broadly for two reasons. First, 
the "context of [the] labor relations setting"41 and the employ-
ees' economic dependence made it more likely that workers 
would "pick up intended implications"- that is, veiled threats-
37. See, e.g., Givhan v. Wescern Line Canso/. Sch. Disc., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979) 
(holding that the rights of employees to comment on matters of public concern "must be 
balanced against the interests of the state as employer, in promoting the efficiency of 
public services it performs though its employees" and citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 
391 u.s. 563, 568 (1968)). 
38. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,617-18 (1969). 
39. 395 u.s. 575 (1969). 
40. !d. at 618. 
41. Id.at617. 
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from an employer's comments. A "more disinterested ear"42 
might dismiss similar comments. Second, the Court noted that 
most workers would not expect to engage in free-spirited debate 
about general political issues and would not take the employer's 
comments about unionization as such. "[W]hat is ... at stake is 
the establishment of a nonpermanent, limited relationship 
[among] the employer, his economically dependent employee 
and his union agent"- that is, the formation of a relationship 
among a particular set of workers, a particular union, and a par-
ticular company, in which the workers have a direct economic 
stake. These facts made it unlikely that a worker could hear the 
employer's comments objectively. Company executives would be 
freer to talk in hearings before Congress because an "independ-
ent voter" could "listen more objectively."43 The same would be 
true if company executives were being interviewed by the New 
York Times. A newspaper reader expects to encounter spirited 
debates on matters of public interest, and is free to believe or 
question a newspaper's content. The Court, in other words, rec-
ognizes that expression in the workplace often has a different 
character, or even a different meaning, than expression in the 
public square. Workers often orient themselves differently to 
workplace speech and to speakers in the workplace than they do 
to expression they encounter on television, on street corners, 
and in the newspaper. 
Let us now examine in more detail expression as it occurs in 
various workplace contexts. 
C. EXPRESSION IN "ORDINARY" WORKPLACES 
Workplaces and public places have varying relationships to 
public discourse. The public library and the Chicago Art Insti-
tute are directly connected to public discourse, while Macy's is 
not. Though every public accommodation or forum is indeed 
someone's workplace, not all workplaces are public accommoda-
tions, and not all public accommodations relate to public dis-
course. The traditional ones-inns, trains, buses, and the like-
do not. Let's begin our examination of workplace expression 
with some run-of-the-mill workplaces-a manufacturing plant, a 
company designed to provide some service like construction or 
accounting, or a company like 3M, Microsoft, or Genentech that 
researches, develops, or creates new products. Though fairly di-
42. ld. 
43. ld.at617-18. 
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verse, these workplaces are similar in two respects. First, the 
goal of the company is to develop, produce, or sell some thing or 
service outside of the scope of the First Amendment. Second, 
the workplace premises are not public accommodations or oth-
erwise open to members of the public. 
1. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards and the issue of 
"protected" but harassing speech 
The plaintiff in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards44 was 
one of a few skilled women craftworkers employed at a ship-
yard.45 She complained that the girlie calendars, pornographic 
centerfolds and sexually graphic cartoons and graffiti in most ar-
eas of the shipyard, t-shirts her coworkers sometimes wore, and 
graphically sexual remarks her coworkers made46 created a 
sexually hostile work environment. The district court agreed that 
the pictures, comments, and graffiti changed the terms, condi-
tions, and privileges of her employment because of her sex. They 
violated Title VII because they were "sufficiently severe or per-
vasive to alter the conditions of {her] employment and create an 
abusive working environment," 7 both in her eyes and in the 
eyes of a reasonable person.48 
Robinson raised interesting First Amendment issues for two 
reasons. First, most of the pictures, cartoons, and graffiti were 
not posted with the purpose of insulting her directly.49 While a 
few scribbled remarks referred to her,50 many of the pictures had 
been posted before she began working at the shipyard. She ob-
jected to them because she found them offensive and because 
they made it harder for her to do her job. Second, her Title VII 
claim rested on utterances, writings, and pictures that the First 
Amendment ordinarily would protect if they had been expressed 
outside of the workplace. 51 Jacksonville Shipyards defended it-
44. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991). 
45. Id. at 1491. 
46. ld. at 1496-99. 
47. ld. at 1523. 
48. Id. at 1524-25. See also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21-22 (1993). 
49. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1522-23. Some of the graffiti was directed at her, but 
most of the pictures were not. 
50. Id. at 1498-99 (detailing references to "boola-boola" jokes about her and sexual 
graffiti written above the hook upon which she hung her jacket). 
51. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc., v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1990) ("[S]exual 
expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment"); 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (same); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) 
(holding that wearing a "Fuck the Draft" jacket was protected expression). 
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self on this ground, arguing that the postings were protected 
speech. 
The Robinson court rejected the free speech defense. The 
court reasoned that behavior that is tolerable or even appropri-
ate in some contexts can be abusive in the workplace52 and that 
this case represented one such instance. The defendants, how-
ever, also argued that the pictures, despite their offensiveness, 
were protected by the First Amendment. Though the case did 
not state as much, the defendants appeared to rely on the First 
Amendment principle that generally prohibits the government 
from regulating expression because it causes offense.53 To hold 
the shipyard liable for the speech's offense would be a classic 
content or viewpoint restriction. The court, however, dismissed 
this proposition, holding that "the pictures and verbal harass-
ment are not protected speech because they act as discrimina-
tory conduct in the form of a hostile work environment."54 The 
court quoted Roberts v. United States Jaycees:55 "Potentially ex-
pressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their 
communicative impact ... are entitled to no constitutional pro-
tection. "56 
The court's assertion that the pictures amounted to dis-
criminatory conduct, however, simply assumed that conclusion. 
It is true that if these pictures and graffiti appeared elsewhere, 
they would have been protected. The court's assertion does not 
explain why they could be regulated in the workplace context. 
The citation to Roberts compounded rather than resolved the 
problem. In Robinson the very offensiveness of the pictures is 
what caused the discrimination; the communicative impact of the 
speech and the "special harm" it causes are identical. The Rob-
inson court therefore cannot say that the harm-the discrimina-
tion- from the pictures is distinct from their offensiveness. Or 
can it? 
It is too quick to say that the First Amendment does notal-
low government to restrict speech because it causes offense. The 
scope of permissible restrictions varies greatly depending on 
where expression occurs. Had Matt Fraser exhorted college stu-
52. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1525-26 ("(T]he whole point of the sexual harassment 
claim is that behavior that may be permissible in some settings ... can be abusive in the 
workplace"). (ellipses in original) (citations omitted). 
53. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-25. 
54. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1535. 
55. RobertS v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
56. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1535 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628). 
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dents, not high school students, to vote for a student council 
candidate because he ''doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives 
hard, pushing and pushing until finally-he succeeds," Fraser's 
speech would have been protected.57 Had Frank Snepp written 
about his experiences as a Department of Labor employee, 
rather than as a CIA agent, the Court probably would not have 
enforced his pre-clearance agreement. 58 
It is therefore not surprising that Playboy centerfolds might 
represent protected expression in one place but support a cause 
of action for harassment in another. The First Amendment 
would surely protect centerfolds displayed in a museum gallery. 
But if someone in the gallery of a courtroom held up a center-
fold for all to see, a judge could hold that person in contempt 
because that expression could disrupt courtroom proceedings. 
Because context drives the scope of permissible regulations 
of expression, the function of the workplace must also affect the 
scope of First Amendment protection. The CIA has greater lee-
way to limit its employees' speech to protect national security 
than does the Department of Labor because secrecy is the CIA's 
essence but not the Labor Department's. Similarly, the First 
Amendment would bar a museum guard's suit if she complained 
that an exhibition of female nudes created a hostile work envi-
ronment, but not a shipyard worker's suit over similar postings 
on the walls of her workplace. Exhibitions are the museum's 
mission but not the shipyard's. 
2. Dignitary harms in public discourse 
Legal actions for offense or disruption caused by utterances 
or writings are commonplace. Defamation, libel, slander, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, and false-light all provide 
recovery for harm caused by speech or writings claimed to be of-
fensive. 
When faced with conflicts between suits for dignitary torts 
and the First Amendment, the Court has not always favored the 
First Amendment. The Court has been primarily interested in 
ensuring "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate59 in par-
ticular arenas of life. In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court 
57. See Bethel Sch. Disc. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986) (holding that a high 
school could punish a student for lewd speech because a "high school assembly or class-
room is no place for a sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting au-
dience of teenage students"). 
58. See Snepp v. United Scates, 444 U.S. 507,509 n.3, 510 (1980) (per curiam). 
59. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964). 
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held that public figures and officials who sue a newspaper for li-
bel must prove that the alleged falsehood was published with 
knowledge that the item was false or with reckless disregard for 
the truth.60 The Court created this "breathing space"61 so that 
the press will not self-censor to avoid liability.62 Hustler Maga-
zine v. Falwelt3 extended the "actual malice" rule to intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claims by public figures. Pre-
sumably, other tort actions by public figures objecting to com-
ments about them would also face the "actual malice" stan-
dard.64 
The court cases that have created and sustained the 
"breathing room" provided by the New York Times's actual mal-
ice standard have generally been cases in which a public person 
has objected to his or her treatment in the press. In New York 
Times, the plaintiff was an Alabama sheriff who had been men-
tioned in an advertisement in the Times. This allegedly libeled 
official had been an outspoken opponent of integration and had 
trumpeted his segregationist views. In Hustler, Jerry Falwell, the 
founder and leader of the "Moral Majority"65 and an active po-
litical commentator,66 complained that a Campari ad parody in 
Hustler Magazine, which portrayed him as having lost his virgin-
ity to his drunken mother in the family's outhouse, was inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. 
New York Times does not mean that public officials and fig-
ures are not hurt by insult and invective.67 Rather, New York 
Times bars legal actions for their injuries because the Constitu-
tion elevates the importance of debate about public matters and 
public firures over any state interest in protecting public figures' 
dignity. 6 The similarities between Hustler and New York 
60. ld. at 279-80. 
61. ld. at 272. 
62. ld. at 279. 
63. 485 U.S. 46,56 (1988). 
64. But see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 572-75 (1977) 
(finding that the tort for recovery of economic advantage was distinct from dignitary 
torts for First Amendment purposes). 
65. The Moral Majority lobbied for school prayer and instruction on creationism in 
public schools, and fought the Equal Rights Amendment, abortion rights, and rights for 
gays and lesbians. Columbia Encyclopedia 6th Ed.2001, at <http://www.bartleby.com/ 
65/c-/E-MoralMajo.html> (last visited April 25, 2003). 
66. Sec Falwell, 485 U.S. at 47 (observing that Falwell was "active as a commenta-
tor on politics" in the 1980s). 
67. See Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1321, 1321 
(1992) ("[R ]obust free speech systems protect speech not because it is harmless, but de-
spite the harm it may cause."). 
68. See id. at 1322 ("[Ejxisting understandings of the First Amendment presuppose 
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Times- both involved press publications and criticisms of well-
known people active in state and national politics-are no coin-
cidence. These facts, as well as the fact that the offending ad 
parody in Hustler was well within the tradition of political satire, 
were crucial to the Court's application of the actual malice stan-
dard to the plaintiffs' claims of libel, defamation, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.69 
In Hustler, the Court recognized that Falwell was bound to 
attract criticism, some of it intemperate and possibly juvenile 
and scatological, because he had put himself out on the national 
political stage as a moral leader and had publicly advocated con-
troversial ideas. "[O]ne of the prerogatives of American citizen-
ship is the right to criticize public men and measures. "70 Public 
figures become subjects of discourse as well as participants by 
choosing to enter the fray. The attention they receive will not 
always be positive, and some of it might be quite vicious. Intem-
perate, hyperbolic, colorful criticism ~rabs listeners' attention 
and telegraphs the speaker's emotions. 1 "The distortion of lan-
guage to emphasize a point" -presenting Jerry Falwell as a 
white-trash hypocrite who screws his mother-"is present in 
varying degrees in virtually all human dialogue."72 First 
Amendment "protection cannot" therefore "turn on whether a 
speaker's metaphor fits the plain and natural meaning of the 
words used." 73 For these reasons, speech about public figures re-
ceives extra protection from tort suits.74 
The Court's immunization of most public criticisms of pub-
lic figures from tort actions does not deny the outrage, trauma, 
and hurt Falwell and other plaintiffs suffer.75 Indeed, the Hustler 
that legal toleration of speech-related harm is the currency with which we as a society 
pay for First Amendment protection"). 
69. The court explained in Falwell: 
The sort of robust political debate encouraged by the First Amendment is 
bound to produce speech that is critical of those who hold public office or those 
public figures who arc 'intimately involved in the resolution of important public 
questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to soci-
ety at large.' 
485 U.S. at 51 (citation omitted). 
70. Id. (citing Baumgartner v. United States., 322 U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944) (Frank-
furter, J.)). 
71. Schauer, 64 Va. L. Rev. at 284 (cited in note 36). 
72. Id. at 285. 
73. Id. 
74. Sec Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 337-39 (1974) (describing how 
public figures and officials, unlike private individuals, have the ability to "secur[ e] access 
to channels of communication sufficient to rebut falsehoods concerning" them and have 
"voluntarily placed" themselves "in the public spotlight"). 
75. Cf. Schauer, 92 Colum. L. Rev. at 1323 (cited in note 67) ("[T]he harms ensuing 
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ad-parody probably did outrage and traumatize Falwell. But nei-
ther does the law allow Falwell recovery for his injuries because 
it might chill debate that is more important to the community 
than permitting recovery for that trauma. Whether Jerry Falwell 
was a hypocrite or a sincerely moral person affected people's 
opinions about his and the Moral Majority's involvement in na-
tional politics. It is impossible to talk about politics without talk-
ing about specific public and political figures, their character, 
and their trustworthiness. 
3. Offense outside of public discourse and workplace 
harassment 
The reasons behind Falwell's and Sullivan's defeats do not 
apply to most tort actions based on expression. In most cases, a 
private person (as opposed to a public official or rmblic figure) 
may sue others who have negligently defamed her.76 Employers 
may be sued for defamation when they give terrible references 
about former employees.77 As a result, many employers now de-
cline to give substantive references for former employees.78 
While this trend is unfortunate, it is hardly a First Amendment 
issue, at least as currently conceived by First Amendment doc-
trine.79 
Nor do the reasons behind Falwell's and Sullivan's defeats 
apply more generally to the workplace. The First Amendment 
restricts public officials and public figures from recovering for 
defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress be-
cause allowing them to recover would diminish public discourse, 
and we believe public discourse is more important than complete 
tort recovery.80 The decision to ignore injuries caused by indi-
vidual torts to create "breathing room" for more valuable speech 
from factually erroneous statements about identified individuals are hard to deny"). 
76. Sec Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 ("[S]o long as they do not impose liability without 
fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability" for 
defamation); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985) 
(holding that states may impose liability for negligence if defamatory statement was 
about a private person and was not about a matter of public concern). 
77. See, e.g., Jensen v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 14 Cal. App. 4th 958, 965 (Cal. App. 
1993); Marshall v. Brown, 141 Cal. App. 3d 408, 412-13 (Cal. App. 1983); Cal. Lab. 
Code,§ 1050 (misdemeanor to misrepresent the facts regarding a former employee to 
prevent the employee's further employment), § 1054 (treble damages for misrepresenting 
employment facts). 
78. See Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment References: 
Problems of "Overdeterrence" and a Proposal for Reform, 13 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 45, 
45-48 (1995). 
79. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 763. 
80. Sec Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,50 (1988). 
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would sit uncomfortably in the highly regulated, instrumental 
domain of most ordinary workplaces. 
Unlike defamation or emotional distress claims brought by 
public figures, liability for workplace harassment does not 
threaten public discourse. Public figures are the currency 
through which we discuss public affairs; private employees are 
not. The hostile work environment cause of action does not raise 
the classic First Amendment worry-that government will sup-
press speech critical of it or with which a majority disagrees81 or 
impinge on public discourse generally.82 The purpose is to allow 
women and minorities to go as far and make as much money as 
white men, and to equalize the yield from working by equalizing 
the cost of working for all, regardless of their membership in a 
protected class. Though expression may create liability, that li-
ability rests on economic concerns, not concerns grounded in the 
social mores of a particular community or political faction. 
This economic harm arises in part from injury to the plain-
tiff's personality, much as defamation, libel, slander, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress do.83 The Robinson court 
recognized this kind of insult to personality: 
When the pre-existing state of the work environment receives 
weight in evaluating its hostility to women, only those women 
who are willing to and can accept the level of abuse inherent 
in a given workplace-a place that may have historically been 
all male or historically excluded women intentionally-will 
apply to and continue to work there. It is absurd to believe 
that Title VII opened the doors of such places in form and 
closed them in substance. A pre-existing atmosphere that de-
ters women from entering or continuing in a profession or job 
is no less destructive to and offensive to workplace equality 
than a sign declaring "Men Only. "84 
81. New York Times' "actual malice" standard for defamation of public officials in 
large part grows out of the concern that the government will attempt to ban seditious 
libel. 
82. See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 55-56 (describing the importance of insulting politi..:al 
cartoons about public officials and figures to public discourse and expressing concern 
that juries might impose liability for speech that ran counter to community mores). 
83. See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 Harv. L. 
Rev. 445. 509-511 (1997) (describing a hostile work environment as "fundamentally an 
injury to dignity," and comparing the hostile work environment cause of action to digni-
tary torts). But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the 
First Amendment Dog that Didn't Bark, 1994 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 9-11 (arguing that Harris v. 
Forklift Systems refused to narrow hostile work environment to fit the boundaries of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress). 
84. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1526 (M.D. Fla. 
1991). Robinson's analogy to "Men Only" signs implicitly categorizes the pornography at 
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Even if the explicit or implicit message of posters, jokes, or graf-
fiti is not "men only," insults, derogatory jokes and pornography 
undermine the conditions necessary for equal employment op-
portunity. One can view posters, jokes, and graffiti as creating a 
particular workplace community and defining community mem-
bers as men who fuck women, rather than work with (or, heaven 
forbid, for) them. Disrupting discourse that defines the commu-
nity or sub-community, or at least declaring it illicit from the 
employer's point of view, allows the workplace community to be 
redefined to include women. In that sense, the hostile work envi-
ronment cause of action serves as the inverse of the First 
Amendment. It is a rule that forces men to suspend the norms of 
the particular community they would like to constitute to permit 
competing community visions to take hold. 
4. Workplaces must enforce civility norms to be productive, 
while public discourse requires their suspension 
Civility among workers is necessary to maintain conditions 
of equality. Expression that denegrates members of a protected 
class may thwart equal opportunity even if it does not explicitly 
communicate an exclusionary message. Antidiscrimination laws 
and the hostile work environment cause of action enforce a kind 
of civility norm within the workplace- the norm of equal oppor-
tunity regardless of race, sex, national origin, color, and disabil-
ity. In particular, the hostile work environment cause of action 
regulates workplace interactions to maintain conditions condu-
cive to equal opportunity. 
O'Shea v. Yellow Technology Services, Inc. 85 illustrates the 
importance of civility to equal opportunity. Maurine O'Shea al-
leged that a coworker's derogatory comments about women-
both about her and about women generally-undermined her 
productivity.86 O'Shea "overheard [her coworker] making fun of 
his wife" and other women, saying that "women talk too much 
and are less intelligent than men," and that "Playbol is superior 
to a wife because ... with Playboy you get variety."8 He also de-
scribed a dream he had about a naked woman jumping on a 
trampoline, describing this woman's breasts in detail. 88 Over-
the shipyard as performatives. The court's analogy assumes women would read the porn 
as the equivalent of being told to work elsewhere. 
85. 185 F.3d 1093 (lOth Cir. 1999). 
86. !d. at 1098-1100. 
87. !d. at 1098. 
88. !d. 
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heard remarks such as these might be characterized as "envi-
ronmental harassment," in contrast to insults particularly di-
rected at one person. This coworker, O'Shea alleged, also told 
other workers that O'Shea "was incompetent and unable to do 
her job," that she was "overemotional and hysterical," and that 
women were generally "incompetent, stupid, and scatter-
brained. "89 
When O'Shea complained, her coworkers ostracized her.90 
Before this coworker joined O'Shea's team, O'Shea's supervisor 
had described her as "a very competent systems programmer," 
"a team player," and "cooperative."91 After her coworker began 
denegrating her and other women and complaining to other co-
workers that O'Shea was "going to file a sexual harassment suit 
against him," her coworkers "cut off contact with her" and 
"treat[ed] her poorly.'.n "[M]ale programmers never invited 
[her] to lunch outside of the office unless she invited herself," 
and they shifted their discussions about work-related technical 
matters to sports to exclude her from conversation.93 They ig-
nored her when she tried to discuss mutual work projects with 
them. When she complained about being ostracized, her supervi-
sor (who was also a woman) held a meeting with the men in-
volved. The meeting compounded the rift.94 Ultimately, some of 
her coworkers "stonewalled" her, refused "to communicate with 
her," and "respond[ed] to her questions ... with monosyllabic 
answers." They refused to give her computer files she needed to 
get work done.95 Over time, she was seen as the problem be-
cause she was increasingly paranoid and insecure.96 
O'Shea highlights the connection between collegial relations 
with coworkers and on-the-job productivity: work interactions 
that are ostensibly social (kibbitzing, ~oing to lunch, etc.) also 
affect an individual's job performance. 7 O'Shea also illustrates 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 1099-1100. 
91. ld. 
92. Id. at 1099. 
93. Id. at 1099-1100. 
94. ld. at 1100. 
95. Id. at 1099-1101. 
96. Id. 
97. Robert Post has described "the unique power" of "(o]utrageous speech ... [to] 
call[] community identity into question [and] ... to focus attention, dislocate old assump-
tions, and shock its audience into the recognition of unfamiliar forms of life." Robert C. 
Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic 
Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 601,632, (1990). 
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that work roles affect worker's interactions and that people at 
work do not encounter each other on an equal footing. 
Work roles inhibit the expression of individual personalities 
and restrict how people interact. Hierarc~ and power shape the 
dynamics of discussion in the workplace. 8 Arguing with a boss 
feels different than arguing with a friend, whether the argument 
is about politics or business, because a boss wields power-to 
fire, set salaries, and determine readiness for promotion. For in-
stance, any law teacher who has ever argued with a first-year 
student is aware of the feeling of arguing with someone not her 
equal. The disparity arises in part from the fact that the teacher 
possesses more knowledge, but also from the fact that the 
teacher has power over the student. 
Arguments with coworkers at work also have a different 
dynamic from arguments outside work. The very fact of being at 
work restricts the intensity, style, and tone of arguments because 
the desire to remain employed almost always mediates behavior 
at work. Our economic dependence on work restricts what we 
can discuss, how we talk about things, and the positions we are 
willing to advocate while we are at work. In this way, a work-
place resembles Robert Post's description of a community:99 for 
a workplace to be productive, members must agree with the 
norms and ends of the workplace and place them above their 
private interests. At least, individuals must be willing to behave 
as if they agree with the norms and aims of the workplace. 
Current work norms usually require us to favor work over 
kibbitzing and conducting our personal affairs. Consequently, 
much workplace expression is instrumental to doing work. Peo-
ple may talk about a number of things at work, but it is work 
that brought them there and constitutes, at least initially, the ba-
sis for their discussions. At work, talk about things other than 
work is incidental to work and, at a moment's notice, may le-
gitimately be disrupted by the superior demands of work. 
(Things are trickier when a workplace's mission is the produc-
tion of discourse, but more on that point in section D.) 
In the government-employee speech cases, the Court has 
repeatedly recognized that employees' expression takes a back-
98. Post, Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment at 611 (cited in note 15). 
99. Id. at 614-15 (cited in note 15) ("'fT]hc workplace has constitutionally been un-
derstood as a site of community, not democracy."); Post, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 632-35 
(cited in note 97) (contrasting the public sphere, in which the Constitution requires the 
suspension of civility norms, with communities and the private sphere, both of which re-
quire civility norms to exist). 
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seat to doing work. First Amendment doctrine has thus made 
way for the practical necessities of controlling "expression" in 
this work context. Quite simply, governmental organizations 
have a strong interest in "promot[ing] efficiency and integrity in 
the discharge of official duties, and [in] maintain[ing] proper dis-
cipline in the public service." 100 
To this end, the Government, as an employer, must have wide 
discretion and control over the management of its personnel 
and internal affairs. This includes the prerogative to remove 
employees whose conduct hinders efficient operation and to 
do so with dispatch. Prolonged retention of a disruptive or 
otherwise unsatisfactory employee can adversely affect disci-
pline and morale in the work place, foster disharmond:, and ul-
timately impair the efficiency of an office or agency. 1 1 
Consequently, government employers face few constraints when 
firing employees for expression that disrupts the workplace, if 
that expression does not address matters of public concern. 
Even when political speech is involved, government em-
ployers can fire em~loyees who disrupt the workplace. In Ran-
kin v. McPherson, 1 2 the Supreme Court held that a clerical 
worker in a county constable's office could not be fired for re-
marking to a coworker, within the deputy constable's earshot, 
that she hoped that the next person who tried to shoot President 
Reagan would "get him." This case is often cited as an example 
of the limits on government employers' power to regulate em-
ployees' speech. Rankin, however, is based on the assumption 
that government can sometimes regulate its employees' political 
speech. A government employer may do so if the "balance be-
tween the interests of the employee, as a citizen, in commenting 
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as 
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs through its employees"103 tips in favor of the govern-
ment employer's interest. Factors in this analysis include 
"whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or har-
mony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close 
working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence 
are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker's du-
ties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise."104 
100. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-51 (1983). 
101. Id. 
I 02. 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
103. !d. at 384 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 
I 04. !d. at 388. 
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McPherson could not be fired for her remark because no one 
could interpret it as seriously advocating or validating violence 
against the president. The constable's office could not show that 
McPherson's comment disrupted work or that it evinced a 
"character trait that made" her "unfit" to work. 105 Instead, 
McPherson was fired because the remark rankled Rankin. 106 
The First Amendment does not absolutely shield employees 
who speak out on matters of public concern.107 The Court in 
Rankin took pains to explain that when an employee's speech on 
a matter of public concern does disrupt a government office, a 
government employer can fire the employee.108 Rankin cited 
McCullen v. Carson, an Eleventh Circuit case, for this proposi-
tion. In McCullen, the Jacksonville sheriff's department fired 
McCullen, a clerical employee, who had said on local television 
news that he worked for the sheriff's office and, in his spare 
time, recruited for the Ku Klux Klan. 
The Eleventh Circuit found that public outrage and internal 
dissension within the police department justified McCullen's 
dismissal even though he was a records clerk and could not ar-
rest anyone. Keeping him would have enraged Jacksonville's 
Black community and made law enforcement more difficult and 
dangerous. "Efficient law enforcement requires mutual respect, 
trust, and support" between the community and the police. 109 
Employing someone who declared himself a member of the Klan 
would have created the impression that the police department 
did not treat individuals impartially. 110 "Jacksonville's black 
community ... would categorically distrust the Sheriff's office if 
a known Klan member were permitted to stay on in any posi-
tion."'" McCullen's presence also threatened the department's 
"esprit de corps,"" as his very presence angered African 
American members of the police force. 113 McCullen shows that 
105. Id. at 389 n.l4 (explaining that Constable Rankin testified that "[he] did not 
base [his] action on whether the work was interrupted or not"). 
106. !d. at 390 ("[I]t is undisputed that [Rankin] fired McPherson based on the con-
tent of her speech ... and because [Rankin] believed that she 'meant it."'). 
107. Sec Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (holding that the rights 
of an employee to comment on matters of public concern must be balanced against the 
interests of the government employer in providing efficient public services); accord 
Givhan v. Western Line Canso/. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410,414 (1979). 
108. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 389, 391 n.18 (citing McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936 
(11th Cir. 1985)). 
I 09. McCullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936, 939 (11th Cir. 1985). 
110. Id. at 938. 
Ill. Id. at 939. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
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the need to maintain civility norms within some work~laces can 
make speech's offense a legitimate basis for regulation. 14 
Let us now leave the work context for the public square. 
Within the realm of public discourse, the First Amendment re-
quires that we suspend our normal rules of civility. The First 
Amendment supports the expression of plural views by allowing 
speakers to communicate their ideas and vie for others' attention 
and sympathy, even if the government disagrees with them. 115 
Standing alone, government neutrality about the substance of 
opinions is not enough to support vibrant public discourse. Gov-
ernment must also remain (mostly) neutral about how opinions 
are expressed. If government can punish the manner of commu-
nication, it is harder to express opinions that differ from prevail-
ing community viewpoints. 116 
Consider flag burning. A flag-burner can certainly commu-
nicate the same idea by shouting, "Down with the United 
States!" The shout, though, lacks the extreme outrage of burning 
our nation's symbol. Were the government to bow to veterans' 
groups outraged by flag-burning, protesters could not convey an 
important aspect of their message. Civility norms are not univer-
sal-some are mortally offended by flag burning (Justice Ste-
vens, for example117), while others are not. The government, 
therefore, cannot enforce civility norms within the public sphere 
without enforcing the norms of some community. Enforcing the 
norms of one community-say, banning flag burning, thereby 
enforcing the norms of veterans as against war protesters-
"support[s] some communities and repress[es] others."118 
Within the realm of public discourse, plaintiffs face a heavy, 
often insurmountable, burden when suing for defamation or in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. New York Times v. Sul-
livan,119 Hustler v. Falwel/, 120 and Gertz v. Robert Welch 121 held 
that community standards of offensiveness (on which intentional 
infliction of emotional distress is explicitly based and defamation 
114. Sometimes government agencies can even make political affiliation a condition 
of employment. "[I]f an employee's private political beliefs would interfere with the dis-
charge of his public duties, his First Amendment rights may be required to yield to the 
State's vital interest in maintaining governmental effectiveness and efficiency." Branti v. 
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 366 (1976). 
115. Post, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 629-30 (cited in note 97). 
116. Id. at 638-42. 
117. Sec Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,436 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
118. Post, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 629-30 (cited in note 97). 
119. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
120. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988). 
121. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
2002] CERTAIN ILLUSIONS ABOUT SPEECH 417 
implicitly based) cannot be used to punish speech when it is 
about matters of public importance and where the person claim-
ing harm is a public figure. As the Court explained in Falwell, 
the New York Times standard protects a "world of debate about 
public affairs." 122 Thus, in Garrison v. Louisiana, the Court held 
that a person who vilified a public official could be held liable 
for defamation only if he acted with actual malice. 123 Likewise, in 
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, the Court held that cursing a po-
lice officer cannot be grounds for arrest. 124 
Most of these cases involve expression that is addressed to a 
number of persons. This is no accident. Attending a live speech, 
reading something in a newspaper or magazine, or hearing a 
speech on the radio or television buffers the audience from the 
speaker and his message. This buffer permits the audience to re-
flect on what is said rather than simply react to what is said. A 
person can read and digest information in a newspaper or maga-
zine, and audience members can leave or tune the speech out. 
The one exception, Lewis v. City of New Orleans, involves a 
public officer who is required by his official role to react in an 
impersonal way to members of the public. Police officers are the 
government officials closest to such protests, and are therefore 
the most likely to be the objects of offensive acts. Allowing po-
lice officers, through arrest or suit, to penalize offensive expres-
sion they encounter on the job could suppress an enormous 
amount of expression, from parades to anti-government tirades. 
Many ordinary workplaces have little in common with these 
cases. Expression within ordinary workplaces rarely resembles 
public discourse. People in public places can more easily avoid 
derogatory or graphic jokes or degrading graffiti or images than 
workers can. More importantly, workers may orient themselves 
differently to expression in the workplace than they do to ex-
pression that appears in a newsgaper or magazine or is shouted 
from the steps of a courthouse.1 By no means was the Robinson 
plaintiff a "reader," "viewer," or "spectator" of the porno-
graphic images and graffiti at the shipyard-she encountered 
that expression differently than someone who is leafing through 
122. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 53. 
123. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,78 (1964). 
124. 415 U.S. 130,131-32 (1974). 
125. Sec Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that state could not ban 
Cohen from wearing his "Fuck the Draft" jacket hccause others were free to avert their 
eyes if his message offended them). 
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a magazine. Nor was O'Shea a "member of an audience" when 
her coworker ruminated about Playboy's superiority. 
Thus, if the line between the private sphere and the realm 
of public discourse marks the shift from the commitments of a 
particular community to values such as "neutrality, diversity, and 
individualism," 126 ordinary workr,laces usually stand outside of 
the realm of public discourse. 1 7 Such workplaces are rarely 
characterized by employees' unfettered debate on a broad range 
of topics. Outside academia, few workplaces are dedicated to 
fostering freewheeling expression of plural viewpoints. 
Some commentators have argued that work is an increas-
ingly important locus for public debate. It is a mistake, Cynthia 
Estlund argues, to treat the workplace as entirely outside of the 
realm of public discourse. 128 Work, she says, has become a cen-
tral place for discourse on public issues because Americans 
spend so much time at work 129 (and increasingly less time in 
other group settings). 130 Work also provides a unique opportu-
nity for people to talk with "individuals from diverse back-
grounds and perspectives," people of other races and ethnicities, 
religions, education levels, and class backgrounds. 131 Hierarchi-
cal relationships, she concedes, may darken this rosy view of the 
workplace as a cross-class and cultural meeting place. 132 She also 
126. Post, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 680 (cited in note 97). 
127. Hanna Pitkin's discussion of Hannah Arendt's distinction between the public 
realm and the social and private realms illustrates this point. Pitkin contrasts the public 
realm, in which "a plurality of perspectives" may and should flourish (Hanna Fenichel 
Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private and Public, 9 Pol. Theory 327, 333 (1981)) and Ar-
endt's conception of public action, which "stresses the urge toward self-disclosure at the 
expense of all other factors, and therefore is highly individualistic" (id. at 336 (quotations 
omitted)) with the private sphere, which is "governed by necessity" and the need to pro-
vide the necessities of life. ld. at 331. The private and social spheres are the spheres "for 
labor" and other "activities 'related to the maintenance' of life." Id. 
128. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Prob-
lem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 687,720 (1997) ("I will argue for a ... 
conception of ... freedom of expression in which the core domain of public discourse is 
surrounded by satellite domains of discourse ... such as the workplace."). 
129. Id. at 733 (arguing that "most adults spend much of their waking life at work, 
and much of the time and space that individuals have for political discussion outside their 
families is at work"). 
!30. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community (2000) (documenting the decline in civic and social group participation 
among Americans). 
131. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Architecture of the First Amendment and the Case of 
Workplace Harassment, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1361, 1375 (1997); see also Estlund, 75 
Tex. L. Rev. at 727 (cited in note 128) ("In the workplace individuals interact with oth-
ers-initially strangers, often from diverse cultural, ethnic, political, and religious back-
grounds-in a constructive way toward common aims."). 
132. Estlund, 75 Tex. L. Rev. at 728-29 (cited in note 128). 
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admits that work requires civility rules to function and to pro-
mote equality among workers. 133 
Despite these caveats, Professor Estlund argues that the 
First Amendment should presumptively shield expression at 
work from hostile work environment liability. The presumption 
could be overcome if the contested expression falls within "es-
tablished categories of unprotected speech," 134 if the expression 
was "directed at a listener whom the speaker knows" will "be of-
fended on the basis of the listener's" membership in a protected 
class,135 or if it was expressed in a "grossly and manifestly offen-
sive"136 way that offended coworkers could not avoid. 137 Except 
in these cases, Professor Estlund would suspend 9overnment-
enforced civility rules at work in favor of expression. 38 
It is not clear that this proposal would create more protec-
tion for speech than existing law. Cases establishing liability for 
environmental harassment that the plaintiff could have avoided 
are rare, if they exist. And at any rate such liability would be un-
justified under current law-something easily avoidable cannot 
be severe and pervasive. Her suggestion that actionable envi-
ronmental harassment be "grossly and manifestly offensive"139 
arguably compounds, not cures, any vagueness problems. Add-
ing adverbs to the constitutionally suspect adjective "offensive" 
hardly helps. Is Playboy in, but Hustler out? The terms "hostile 
and abusive" are at least somewhat narrower than "offensive," 
and the current legal standard also gives us a benchmark- the 
reasonable person. "The reasonable person" standard is a noto-
riously squishy standard. But a squishy benchmark is better than 
none, and "grossly and manifestly offensive" has no benchmark. 
Professor Estlund's proposal suffers from other problems. 
Her suggestion that expression that falls within "established 
categories of unprotected speech" would remain unprotected in 
the workplace is too quick. She appears to assume that the 
phrase "categories of unprotected speech" designates a particu-
lar set of things and that this set can be easily imported from the 
realm of public discourse-sidewalks and parks-into the work-
place. Whether expression is protected or unprotected is a judg-
133. Id. at 751. 
134. Id. at 752. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
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judgment based largely on context. Put Officer McPherson in 
front of the police department wearing a sandwich board embla-
zoned with "Hinckley: Next time, don't miss!", and the Court 
might have blessed her firing. Had abortion doctors featured on 
previous "Guilty" posters not been murdered, the American 
Life Coalition's posters might have been protected speech.140 
In the workplace, the very question that must be answered 
is how the particular workplace context alters the social meaning 
and effect of expression. Because context drives the conclusion 
that speech is or is not protected, it is nonsensical to propose 
that "established categories of unprotected speech" be applied 
to the workplace context. 
Significantly, too, Professor Estlund's proposal underesti-
mates the importance of workplace civility rules and the dis-
crimination that would result from their suspension. She does 
concede that her picture of the workplace as a locus for debate is 
probably idealized because many workplaces are hierarchically 
organized. Her portrayal is idealized, but hierarchy is not the 
culprit. However a workplace is organized, pluralistic expression 
does not typify most work relationships. Work responsibilities 
pervade and complicate interactions with coworkers and subor-
dinates and inhibit open and frank exchanges. 
Indeed, work structures based on teamwork, rather than 
top-down management, seem to make civility among workers 
more, not less, important. In the last decade or so many work-
places have moved toward "flatter" organizational structures 141 
with looser, more fluid job roles and responsibilities to facilitate 
greater teamwork and creativity.142 Increasingly, employees must 
cooperate on projects and assignments. Employees have begun 
"to think of their organizational identity as being determined at 
least in part by the teams of which they are members. "143 Failing 
140. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Columbia!Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of 
Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1048, 1062, 1066, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 2002) (en bane) (citing the fact 
that abortion doctors who had been featured on previous "Wanted" posters were mur-
dered as contributing to the "Guilty" posters' threatening nature). 
141. Catherine Casey, Work, Self and Society 108 (Routledge, 1995). ("The new 
technologies, and the new culture [of teamwork and family], have departed from spe-
cialization of knowledge and function, characteristic of industrialism ... to a multiplicity 
of knowlcdges and roles. Specialization and demarcation are giving way to generalization 
and flexibility.") 
142. Sec Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide 273, 
282 (Basic Books Inc., 1984). 
143. Susan Albers Mohrman and Susan G. Cohen, When People Get Out of the Box, 
in Ann Howard, cd., The Changing Nature of Work 365, 371 (Jossey-Bass Inc., Pubs., 
1995). 
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to get along with one's coworkers "carries" a "big penalty, be-
cause the collective [team] product is evaluated," not one indi-
vidual's part. 144 Getting along with others and being a "good 
team player" is essential to a worker's ability to succeed, even in 
traditional factory settings and corporate offices. Teamwork 
"requires the deliberate creation of a substitute, discursive social 
cohesion that is necessary for production to occur. ... Relation-
ship to a product, to team-family members and to the company 
displaces identification with occupation and its historic reposi-
tory of skills, knowledge[] and allegiances. "145 
As O'Shea demonstrates, even low-level environmental 
harassment has the potential to isolate and undermine workers. 
Professor Estlund admits as much. The very qualities that make 
work seem attractive to her as a forum for discussion- that work 
is "a collection of individuals who must form relationships and 
cooperate toward common aims despite potentially diverse 
backgrounds"146 -make "unconstrained speech" "potentially 
explosive." 147 Unconstrained debate can disrupt diverse work 
forces more than homogenous ones. Professor Estlund concedes 
that uninhibited debate can "inflict greater harms within the 
workplace than in the public square, partly because of the close 
and ongoing personal engagement that the workplace com-
pels."148 As Jack Balkin has observed, "[f]ew audiences are more 
captive than the average worker." 149 Indeed, Professor Estlund 
explains that an effort to make the workplace a locus for unin-
hibited discussions free from civility constraints could backfire: 
It could "poison the workplace as a forum for pluralistic ex-
change and destroy the possibility of constructive engage-
ment."150 In short, harassment and a worker's complaints about 
harassment jeopardize a person's status as a team member, keep 
her from getting work done, and imperil her job. 
If uninhibited discussions can "destroy the possibility of 
constructive engagement," 151 why does Professor Estlund want 
to make workplaces presumptively part of public discourse? She 
hopes, first, that if work is made a place for discussion and de-
144. Id. at 373. 
145. Casey, Work, Self and Society at 109 (cited in note 141). 
146. Estlund, 75 Tex. L. Rev. at 735 (cited in note 128). 
147. Id. 
148. !d. 
149. J. M. Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the 
First Amendment, 1990 Duke L.J. 375,423 (1990). 
150. Estlund, 75 Tex. L. Rev. at 735 (cited in note 128). 
151. Id. 
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bate, then workers will encounter diverse viewpoints and ideas, 
become more tolerant of others, and become more engaged 
members of our democracy. 152 Second, she hopes that making 
work a "satellite domain of public discourse" will increase work-
ers' powers of self-governance within the workplace. 153 Enhanc-
ing workers' rights to self-governance by reducing legal protec-
tions for equal opportunity is a baffling proposition- federal law 
specifically prohibits labor organizations from engaging in dis-
crimination. I am also skeptical that encountering different 
viewpoints at work makes people more tolerant of differences. 
Would overhearing dirty jokes (seemingly protected under Est-
lund's proposal) make women more tolerant of men? Would be-
ing endlessly proselytized by a coworker make someone more 
tolerant of religion? If these interactions make work harder to 
do-the central inquiry in hostile work environment cases-it 
seems unlikely. Reducing legal protections for equal employ-
ment opportunity for uncertain gains in tolerance seems a bad 
trade-off. 
5. Liability for harassment based on political 
speech in ordinary workplaces 
Within ordinary workplaces, should harassing statements 
that touch on matters of public concern merit special treatment? 
The fact that speech addresses matters of public concern does 
not itself insulate it from common law dignitary torts. Gertz 154and Dun & Bradstreet155 held exactly that: "[T]he fact that ex-
pression concerned a public issue did not by itself entitle the li-
bel defendant to the constitutional protections of New York 
Times." 156 New York Times represents "an accommodation be-
tween [First Amendment] [concerns] and the limited state inter-
est present in the context of libel actions brought by public per-
sons."157 The state has a stronger interest in redressing private 
individuals' reputational harm, in gart because they have not en-
tered the fray of public discourse.1 8 
152. Id. at 694-95. 
153. Id. at 694, 724-27 ("[T]he Constitution should guard against the law's suppres-
sion of employee voice on workplace issues."). 
154. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,343, 348-49 (1974). 
155. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 756 (1985) 
(citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343). 
156. ld. at 756. 
157. Id. ("[W]e found [in Gertz] that the state possessed a 'strong and legitimate ... 
interest in compensating private individuals for injury to reputation."'). 
158. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 ("[T]here is a compelling normative consideration under-
lying the distinction between public and private defamation plaintiffs. An individual who 
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A kind of cost-benefit analysis underlies First Amendment 
dignitary tort cases. Speech about public officials or figures re-
ceives the highest level of protection because the ability to ex-
press opinions about such persons and their affairs is the essence 
of self-government. To deter as little of this expression as possi-
ble, the First Amendment requires public officials and figures to 
endure injuries from defamation or infliction of emotional dis-
tress, unless the defendant acted with actual malice. 159 
When expression about matters of public concern injures or 
defames a private person, the First Amendment permits recov-
ery if the defendant was negligent about a statement's truth. 160 
The First Amendment does not require private persons to bear 
as much of the cost of expression, and it imposes a greater re-
sponsibility on defendants to verify their statements. The im-
plicit cost-benefit calculus is obvious: We can generally talk 
about politics and current affairs without discussing a private in-
dividual who cannot respond to criticism as easily as public fig-
ures. The First Amendment therefore permits private individu-
als to recover more readily for their injuries and requires 
speakers to check their facts. Statements that have little to do 
with public affairs and defame a private individual receive al-
most no First Amendment protection- the only restriction is 
that the state may not impose strict liability. Here, too, cost-
benefit analysis is at work. Private gossip about private persons 
has little connection to public discourse, and so permitting pri-
vate individuals' recovery hardly impairs our ability to govern 
ourselves. 
In ordinary workplaces, how do these principles apply to 
expression about matters of public concern that creates a hostile 
work environment? The government's purpose in prohibiting 
workplace harassment is to guarantee equal economic opportu-
nity regardless of a person's membership in a protected class. 
This equality interest is stronger (and has a firmer constitutional 
basis) than the more general interest in protecting people from 
torts to personality. For several reasons discussed here, expres-
sion in ordinary workplaces also has an attenuated connection to 
public discourse. Much workplace expression is instrumental to 
decides to seek governmental office must accept certain necessary consequences of that 
involvement in public affairs."'). 
!59. Sec id. at 342 (observing that the actual malice standard "exacts a ... high price 
from the victims of defamatory falsehood" who will often "be unable to surmount" it). 
160. !d. at 347. If the defamatory statement expressed an opinion and is not capable 
of being falsified, however, a private person cannot recover. Cf. Hustler Magazine v. Fal-
well, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1990). 
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ends having nothing to do with First Amendment values, and 
most people work for reasons unrelated to public discourse. 
Even when workplace expression is about matters of public 
concern, the workplace context often means that speakers and 
listeners relate to each other very differently than they do in 
public. Workplace expression is more likely to be face-to-face or 
in small groups. It is harder to avoid, and workers often have 
ongoing relationships that require them to get along. These fea-
tures make workplace expression resemble regulable utterances 
(like threats or fighting words) more than street-corner debates 
and letters to the editor. Remember, too, that a slip of the lip 
does not a federal case make. Hostile work environment liability 
punishes only that small subset of workplace expression that is 
so abusive that it transforms some protected characteristic of the 
plaintiff into a cost of employment, thereby creating a hostile 
work environment. 161 
Even when expression does concern matters of public inter-
est, hostile work environment liability is consistent with current 
First Amendment doctrine. Governmental interests in protect-
ing the dignity or personality of individuals or their privacy in-
terests may outweigh an individual's interest in expressing her 
opinions freely when the expression occurs outside public dis-
course. Outside public discourse, government must be able to 
"authoritatively. . . construe its own civility rules" because 
"[t]hese rules are deeply important to the maintenance of com-
munity identity." 162 
6. Hostile work environment liability for expression 
in ordinary workplaces does not threaten First 
Amendment values 
Work's instrumental nature, its dependence on behavioral 
norms, employees' economic dependence on work, and the in-
evitable constraints on workers' interactions mean that expres-
sion at most workplaces differs from expression in the public 
square. Sometimes the work context gives expression a different 
meaning than it would have in the public square. Sometimes ex-
pression is more threatening in the workplace. Sometimes ex-
pression impedes a coworker's progress or excludes a worker 
from work teams. 
161. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993). 
162. Post, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 665 (cited in note 97). 
2002] CERTAIN ILLUSIONS ABOUT SPEECH 425 
Because of the relationship of speech to the economic and 
instrumental aspects of work, the Supreme Court has allowed 
expression in the workplace to be regulated more freely than 
expression in public discourse. Thus, government cannot legiti-
mately regulate speech in the public square on the ground that it 
has the potential to disrupt, unsettle, or agitate an audience, ex-
cept in the very narrow case of incitement. In contrast, the Court 
has held in a variety of work contexts that government can, con-
sistent with the First Amendment, regulate speech that disrupts 
the workplace or interferes with work. In ordinary workplaces, 
at least, liability for expression that creates a hostile work envi-
ronment poses no threat to First Amendment values. Communi-
cative workplaces are another story. I turn to that now. 
D. THE EXPRESSIVE WORKPLACE, PUBLIC DISCOURSE, AND 
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT 
Every public accommodation is someone's workplace. 163 In-
teractions among patrons of a public accommodation could 
therefore be described as occurring "in" a workplace. Eugene 
Volokh worries that robust protection against hostile work envi-
ronments will erode freedom of speech in places people gener-
ally use for debate and discussion. Professor Volokh's concerns 
seem particularly reasonable if employers can be liable for fail-
ing to protect their employees from harassment by third parties. 
It is true that most, if not all, public accommodations and 
public fora are workplaces. It is not true that all workplaces are 
fora. Nor is it true that all workplaces are situated the same way 
relative to protected expression. To see this point, compare the 
facts in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards to a museum security 
guard's objection to Playboy centerfolds displayed in the "Imag-
ining the Body-1950 to 2000" exhibit. Can the museum guard 
sue for harassment because she has to look at these crude cen-
terfolds all day long and listen to stupid, sexist, and lewd com-
ments by patrons? Can she force the art museum to cease the 
exhibition or to monitor its patrons' comments for offensive-
ness? 
Even if the centerfolds are exactly the same, the museum 
has a significantly stronger First Amendment defense than the 
shipyard. 164 Quite simply, the exhibition creates and facilitates 
163. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, Harassment Law, and the 
Clinton Administration, 63 L. & Contemp. Probs. 299,325 (2000). 
164. See, e.g., Brooklyn Ins£. of Arts & Scis. v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 
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public discourse in a way that the porn posted at the shipyard 
does not. The museum invites members of the public to its ex-
hibit to engage the images critically. The shipyard does not. Fur-
thermore, without security guards, the museum cannot hold ex-
hibitions. To protect the dignitary interest of someone in the 
museum guard's position would neuter public discourse because 
such a person is necessary to the production of public discourse. 
A museum simply could not function as an art museum if 
guards' harassment suits were sustained. The normative signifi-
cance of the museum in public discourse implies rejection of 
such suits. That normative significance may be so obvious that 
we expect security guard applicants to know what they are get-
ting into. But "assumption of risk" is just one inexact way of stat-
ing the normative inquiry, and it proves too much. A guard can-
not sue, but a shipyard worker can-even she had been warned 
that her workplace would be spiced with porn. 165 
The problem with hostile work environment suits over mu-
seum exhibits is quite simple. An art museum could not function 
as a center for public discourse if it feared these suits based on 
its exhibits. Imagine a museum trying to vet the inoffensiveness 
of its displays. Not only would it be impossible-in a large and 
diverse workforce, someone could object to nearly any art ob-
ject-but such vetting would undermine the very purpose of a 
museum. At their best, museums expand visitors' knowledge, in-
troduce visitors to new things and experiences-sometimes 
beautiful, sometimes uncomfortable-and challenge visitors' 
complacency. A museum that had to stage exhibitions in the 
shadow of potential liability to its employees could mount only 
the most banal exhibits of Impressionist landscapes-even Re-
noir nudes would be out. To preserve museums as places for 
public discourse, therefore, a guard must suspend civility norms 
relative to exhibits just as any other viewer must. 166 
205 (E.D. N.Y. 1999) (granting an art museum's motion for preliminary injunction on 
First Amendment grounds against New York City's attempts to cancel the museum's 
public funding and its building lease because of the "Sensation" exhibit, which featured 
the painting "The Holy Virgin Mary," on which the artist had smeared elephant dung); 
Cuban Museum of Arts & Culture, Inc. v. City of Miami, 766 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D. Fla. 
1991) (granting the museum's motion for a permanent injunction against the city on First 
Amendment grounds; the city had sought to evict the museum from a city building unless 
the museum stopped exhibiting works by artists who had not renounced the Castro re-
gime). 
165. Sec, e.g., Petrosky v. N.Y. State DMV, 72 F. Supp. 2d 39, 58-59 (N.D.N. Y. 1999) 
(denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim 
though the plaintiff had been warned when she began work that other workers used vul-
gar and lewd language). 
166. The security guard has some other options to engage the exhibit critically. She 
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If the museum guard's suit must fail for First Amendment 
reasons, does the shipyard worker's fail, too? No. 
Superficially both involve the same "expression," but the 
cases could not be more different. The shipyard is not open to 
the public. Few people-employees, invited business guests 
(such as suppliers and special customers) and government in-
spectors-will see the extensive porn exhibit. The shipyard ad-
mits employees and business guests for business-related reasons. 
Federal regulations require the shipyard to admit government 
inspectors. None come specifically to see the porn. The shipyard, 
in other words, is not a public accommodation. Those who dis-
play the porn do not have a dialogic relationship with those who 
see the pictures, and they did not post the porn to spark discus-
sions about it. The "display" of pornography at the shipyard is 
just not part of public discourse. Nor does the shipyard produce 
public discourse. Enforcing civility norms at the shipyard does 
not interfere with ship building or with public discourse. Nothing 
about the shipyard's mission or its relationships with its business 
invitees cloaks them with political, and therefore First Amend-
ment, significance. 
Consider a factual variation: A librarian objects to patrons 
who regularly surf Internet porn sites on library computers. She 
can clearly see these images from her reference desk. She also 
cleans out forgotten printouts from the printer bins. More and 
more, she finds obscene printouts, which thanks to fancy print-
ers, are in vivid Technicolor. She demands that the library install 
Internet filters to stop patrons from looking at porn. The avail-
able filters cannot block only obscene images and may also block 
sites with debates about pornography. Facts like these gave rise 
to a hostile work environment claim filed with the EEOC by li-
brarians at the Minneapolis Public Library. The EEOC ruled 
that the library administration was liable for the hostile work 
environment caused by the patrons. 167 
can visit the museum and view the exhibit on her own time. She can start a debate about 
the centerfolds-whether they arc an appropriate subject for an art exhibit, whether the 
museum exhibit subverts or reenforces the images' subjugation of women, or whether 
viewers should take the exhibit ironically or seriously. She could also hand out lliers pro-
claiming her criticisms about the exhibit and the effect it has on society's views of 
women. 
!67. See Steve Brandt, EEOC: Library Internet Porn Created Hostile Environment 
84 Mpls. Star Tribune (May 25, 2001); see also Kevin Diaz, Odd Alliances, New Foes in 
Minneapolis Porn Case, Mpls. Star Tribune A1 (June 5, 2001) (stating that the May 24, 
2001 preliminary ruling by the EEOC recommended a settlement of $75,000 for each 
employee). 
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This case is different from and harder than O'Shea and 
Robinson. In part, it's harder because the librarian does not 
work with the patrons. By contrast, the plaintiffs in Robinson 
and O'Shea had to work with the people who were displaying 
porn or denegrating women. The patrons frequent the librarian's 
workplace, but her job does not depend on their cooperation. It 
is also harder because libraries are places where people seek in-
formation and entertainment, and we think they should do so 
freely and anonymously. Indeed, federal laws guarantee the pri-
vacy of library patrons when they borrow books. The library 
probably carries Penthouse, Playboy, The Joy of Sex, and books 
on sexual fetishes. Presumably patrons check out those materials 
and read them in the library without upsetting librarians. If the 
librarians were upset, that would hardly justify stopping those 
subscriptions or acquisitions. If the librarians complain because 
they see the pictures over the patrons' shoulders or when they 
pick up forgotten printouts, that complaint resembles the mu-
seum security guard's. The hostile work environment cause of 
action would encroach upon public discourse by forcing the li-
brary to block access to web sites containing protected speech. 
The Minneapolis Library case involved more, though. The 
library told the librarians to enforce time limits on Internet ter-
minals to ensure that all who wanted to use them could. Patrons 
looking at porn sites balked. Often, librarians had to ask patrons 
directly to relinquish the terminals. When they did so, patrons 
often met the requests with abuse. 168 Patrons yelled, threatened, 
cursed, and spat at the librarians. One patron even threw a 
chair. 169 Some patrons also masturbated while web-surfing; oth-
ers were obviously sexually aroused when librarians asked them 
to relinquish the computer. 170 These facts turn an "environ-
mental harassment" case based on arguably protected speech 
into a case of one-on-one insults, invective, and physical threats 
beyond the First Amendment's purview. Although the library 
knew about these frightening and disturbing incidents, it appar-
168. Sec James Rosen, Push to Block Internet Porn Picks up Steam; Libraries, 
Schools that Don't Shield Kids Could Lose Funding, Mpls. Star Tribune A1, A9 (July 17, 
2000). 
169. See Paul Levy, Library Limits Porn Access Via the Internet, Mpls. Star Tribune 
Al, A16 (May 6, 2000). 
170. See Rosen, Push to Block Internet Porn Picks up Steam; Libraries, Schools that 
Don't Shield Kids Could Lose Funding at A9 (cited in note 168); see also Levy, Library 
Limits Porn Access Via the Internet at Al6 (cited in note 169) (describing an incident in-
volving a library employee who had to remind patrons that masturbation was not al-
lowed in the library). 
2002] CERTAIN ILLUSIONS ABOUT SPEECH 429 
ently did nothing to protect the librarians or to stop the abuse. 171 
Holding the library liable for failing to protect its librarians from 
verbal and physical abuse presents no real First Amendment 
problem. 
A problem does arise, however, if the only way to stop the 
patrons from bullying the librarians is to block access to porn 
sites because the library concludes that access to these materials 
is causing the patrons to act abusively. Whether the library could 
be required, consistent with the First Amendment, to impose fil-
ters to block access to pornography is a difficult question. Two 
district courts have held that libraries cannot. 172 Libraries are 
public fora, both courts concluded, and less restrictive means ex-
ist to protect children and librarians from pornography. Even 
though one of these decisions dealt with the Children's Internet 
Protection Act, not with workplace harassment, its observations 
are particularly relevant: 
[The] proper method for a library to deter unlawful or inap-
propriate patron conduct, such as harassment or assault of 
other patrons, is to impose sanctions on such conduct, such as 
either removing the patron from the library, revoking the pa-
tron's library privileges, or, in the appropriate case, calling the 
I. 173 po Ice. 
It should also worry us that a First Amendment principle that al-
lowed libraries to use Internet filters to protect librarians from 
violently aroused patrons would also seemingly justify suppress-
ing certain books-Franz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth 
comes to mind-if patrons routinely became violently aroused 
upon reading them in the library. 
The social context of expression determines whether we en-
counter the expression as "speech" in the First Amendment 
sense or as utterances that may be regulated. If expression hap-
pens in a context in which our interactions with others are pri-
marily instrumental-ordinary workplaces-we are likely to see 
171. Sec Levy, Library Limits Porn Access Via the Internet at A1 (cited in note 169) 
(reporting that complaints were lodged with the Minneapolis Public Library during the 
two years before the filing of the complaint, without action; only when the complaint was 
filed did the library create an InteRlet policy to abate the abuse). 
172. American Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9537 (E.D. 
Pa. May 31, 2002) (striking on First Amendment grounds the Children's Internet Protec-
tion Act requirement that federally funded public libraries use Internet filters that ex-
clude access to pornographic web sites); Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trustees of Li-
brary, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 570 (E.D. Va. 1998) (permanently enjoining on First 
Amendment grounds the library's policy of requiring use of internet filters). 
173. American Library, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9537 at *211. 
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that expression as more conduct-like, even if in different context 
we have no doubt that the expression is speech. In other arenas 
that foster, support, and encourage debate, discussion, and the 
expression of a plurality of opinions (such as an art museum or a 
library), we might come to a different conclusion. 
It is telling that we would not dispute restricting Internet 
access if elementary school students were using school com-
puters to surf porn sites. 174 Change the elementary school library 
to a university library, and we have much hand-wringing. 175 If a 
high school, however, wanted to block Internet access to porn, 
we would feel uncomfortable about it, but the regulation would 
likely be upheld.176 These examples demonstrate how the scope 
of regulation allowed by the First Amendment varies according 
to the purpose of the institution. Elementary schools inculcate 
values in young children; universities should challenge those 
values and expand students' world-views; 177 high schools fall 
somewhere in the middle. 
As with schools, so with workplaces. Whether an institution 
is educational or commercial, its mission and its relationship to 
public discourse matter. In ordinary workplaces, where much 
expression is instrumental to achieving ends having little to do 
with the First Amendment, government may regulate a broad 
174. Cf. Bd. of Ed. v. Pica, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion favoring greater 
rights of access to books for junior high and high school students). 
175. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ('To impose any strait 
jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the fu-
ture of our Nation .... Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to 
study and to evaluate, ... otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die."); Papish v. Bd. 
of Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667, 671 (1973) (striking University of Mis-
souri's decision to a expel student because of the publication of a political cartoon that 
depicted a police officer raping the Statue of Liberty and holding that "the First 
Amendment leaves no room for the operation of a dual standard in the academic com-
munity with respect to the content of speech"). 
176. The Court has usually upheld restrictions on the speech of high school students 
if the speech concerned sex, though these decisions have sparked angry dissents. See Be-
thel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (upholding the suspension of a high school 
student for making a sexually suggestive speech at a school event); Hazelwood Sch. Dist 
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266, 272 (1988) (upholding a school's decision to ban articles 
on teen pregnancy in the school newspaper because a school may "disassociate itself ... 
from [vulgar and indecent] speech" that would interfere with its work of teaching stu-
dents "cultural values ... and helping [students] to adjwst normally to [a cultural] envi-
ronment") (quotations and citations omitted). On the other hand, the Court has usually 
struck down politically motivated restrictions on student speech. See Bd of Ed v. Pica, 
457 U.S. 853 (1982) (fractured Court striking down a school district's removal of books 
based on the district's political disagreement with the books' contents). 
177. Indeed, the Court generally equates college newspapers with their adult coun-
terparts. Sec, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Papish v. Bd. of Cura-
tors of Univ. of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667,671 (1973). 
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swath of expression. In expressive workplaces that foster, sup-
port, and encourage debate, discussion, and plural opinions, the 
First Amendment insulates much more. 
II. WHAT CHILL? 
COMPARING HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT 
SUITS WITH DIGNITARY TORTS 
The free-speech critique condemns the hostile work envi-
ronment cause of action as irremediably and unconstitutionally 
vague. 178 As explained above, the hostile work environment 
cause of action inquires whether harassing conduct is so severe 
and pervasive that it alters the terms and conditions of the plain-
tiff's employment by creating objectively and subjectively abu-
sive working conditions. 179 Professor Volokh accuses this stan-
dard of telling employers nearly nothing about their legal 
obligations. 18° Courts assess harassment case by case. In the face 
of this legal uncertainty, he argues, smart employers will clamp 
down on speech within the workplace, disciplining workers for 
discussing politics, religion, and current affairs, or for putting up 
posters about those topics. 181 Critics argue that environmental 
harassment, as distinguished from face-to-face harassment, 
should not be actionable, 182 because environmental cases repre-
sent most of the situations that implicate protected speech. 183 
Professor Volokh has catalogued many worrisome hostile work 
environment complaints. He recounts that workers have charged 
that pictures of the Ayatollah Khomeini tacked on the wall of a 
coworker's cubicle and coworkers' discussions about Christianity 
amount to religious harassment; others have claimed that over-
heard iokes about sex create sexually hostile work environ-
ments.r84 
178. Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does 'Hostile Work Environment' Harassment 
Law Restrict?, 85 Georgetown. L.J. 627, 634-36 (1997); Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as 
Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 
481,501-03 (1991). 
179. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
180. Volokh, 85 Georgetown L.J. at 636 (cited in note 178); Browne, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 
at 483 (cited in note 178) ("[T]he vagueness of the definition of 'harassment' leaves those 
subject to regulation without clear notice of what is permitted and what is forbidden"). 
181. Volokh, 85 Georgetown L.J. at 636 (cited in note 178). 
182. Volokh, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1843-47 (cited in note 28); cf. Estlund, 75 Tex. 
L. Rev. at 750 (cited in note 128) (arguing that harassment that is not face-to-face should 
only be actionable if it is "manifestly and grossly offensive" and cannot be avoided by 
workers). 
183. Volokh, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1843-47 (cited in note 28). 
184. Volokh, 85 Georgetown L.J. at 631-32 (cited in note 178). 
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A. THE REPORTS OF TITLE VII'S BREADTH ARE GREATLY 
EXAGGERATED 
These charges appear damning. And they would be, except 
for a few stubborn facts. There are few (if any) actual cases that 
have allowed complaints based on overheard comments or jokes 
or displayed images to proceed to trial, and few cases in which 
complaints based on comments or discussions about current af-
fairs, religion, or politics (broadly construed) have made it past 
summary judgment. Indeed, on close examination, most of the 
cases Professor Volokh cites are far less troubling than he sug-
gests. Some of the cases dismissed the plaintiff's claims.185 Oth-
ers involve facts far more serious than Professor Volokh's 
descriptions suggest. 186 Another case pre-dates the Court's 
decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., which would have 
185. In the case involving the picture of the Ayatollah Khomeini, the plaintiff did 
not sue for harassment, and the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim that she was fired 
because of her national origin. See Pakiezegi v. First Nat'/ Bank of Boston, 831 F. Supp. 
901 (D. Mass. 1993). The court found that a coworker's posting of the Ayatollah's picture 
did not support the plaintiff's claim that her employer harbored anti· Iranian feelings; the 
court observed that the fact that the employer had the picture removed supported the 
opposite conclusion. ld. at 909. The court in Tunis v. Corning Glass Works, 747 F. Supp. 
951 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), dismissed the plaintiffs hostile work environment and gender dis· 
crimination claims, which were based on her coworkers' posting of a few nude photos 
and their use of gender-specific job titles. Id. at 958-59. The court did mention that the 
use of gender specific job titles could be discriminatory because such titles could give the 
impression that the jobs were closed to women. Id. at 959. But contrary to Professor Vo-
lokh's claim (see Volokh, 85 Georgetown L.J. at 631 (cited in note 178)), the court did 
not say-even in dictum-that the use of such titles could amount to harassment. Finally, 
Bowman v. Heller, 420 Mass. 517 (Mass. S. Jud. Ct. 1995), which Professor Volokh de· 
scribes as a harassment suit based on political speech (see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech and Appellate Review in Workplace Harassment Cases, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1009, 
1014 n.20 (1996)), is far more speech-friendly than he admits. In this case, a woman ran 
against the president of her union. One of the incumbent's supporters circulated a pic· 
ture to a few of his friends that superimposed the plaintiffs face on photos of nude 
women masturbating. (Predictably, these friends circulated it more widely.) The plaintiff 
sued for sexual harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Professor Vo-
lokh does not mention that the appellate court vacated the trial court's finding of sexual 
harassment. 420 Mass. at 519 n.4. Nor docs he mention the appellate court's careful 
analysis of the First Amendment issues raised by the plaintiffs emotional distress claim. 
The court specifically found that the plaintiff was not a limited public figure and that the 
photo was not about a matter of public concern. Id. at 525-26. 
186. For example, two harassment cases Professor Volokh describes as being reli· 
gious environmental harassment cases were actually cases in which the plaintiffs were 
themselves insulted and demeaned based on their religion. In Turner v. Barr, 806 F. 
Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1992), a white, Jewish Deputy U.S. Marshal claimed his suspension 
from duty for a prisoner's escape was actually racial and religious harassment because no 
African American marshals had been suspended for prisoners' escapes. Id. at 1028-29. 
He also claimed that he was insulted on several occasions because of his race and relig-
ion: he was told he would be better at handling money and working in the jewelry busi-
ness than being a marshal; on other occasions, his African American coworkers called 
him a "white ass" and told him to get his "white-ass" out of the office because it was "a 
black office, for blacks, supervised by blacks." ld. at 1028. In Peck v. Sony Music Corp., 
1995 WL 505653 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1995), the plaintiff claimed that her coworker 
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in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., which would have precluded 
its claims.187 Another is a retaliation case in which the court ob-
serves that the conduct about which the plaintiff complained 
would not state a claim for harassment. 188 
I reviewed more than three hundred electronically reported 
district court rulings in hostile work environment cases from 
January 1999 to November 2001. 189 Few (if any) cases involved 
any expression that could be characterized as remotely political. 
And none survived defendants' motions for summary judgment. 
Indeed, most cases based on "environmental harassment" -
overheard dirty or racist jokes, sexual banter, or sexist or racist 
remarks-are dismissed at or before summary judgment. Courts 
routinely find, as a matter of law, that a reasonable person would 
not find overheard comments to be hostile or abusive enough to 
alter a plaintiff's working conditions if the plaintiff is not actually 
their subject. 19° For example, one court dismissed a complaint by 
a car-saleswoman who alleged that her dealership created a hos-
tile work environment when it held a weekend-long sales pro-
motion featuring scantily clad women lounging in a hot-tub. The 
environmental harassment claims that have progressed past 
summary judgment generally have involved the widespread dis-
play of pornography, pornographic cartoons, and sexually ex-
plicit graffiti-Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards is the para-
digmatic example. 
"screamed" at her on many occasions that she would go to hell if she did not repent. Id. 
at *2. He also told her wr ekly that she was a sinner and had to repent. Id. When she ap-
parently did not repent, this coworker held a prayer meeting with another coworker at 
the plaintiffs desk to urge her to repent. I d. 
187. Had the court in Brown Transport Corp. v. Penn. Human Relations Comm'n, 
133 Pa. Cmwlth. 545 (1990), applied Harris's holding that harassment must be "severe or 
pervasive" enough "to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an 
abusive working environment," it should have dismissed the plaintiffs complaint. The 
court found that the bible verses on the plaintiffs pay stubs and religious editorials in the 
company newsletter never "hinder[ed] [the plaintiffs] job performance." Id. at 557. 
188. In Carlson v. Dalton, 1994 WL 735488 (EEOC Apr. 26, 1994), the plaintiff 
claimed that she was retaliated against because she complained about a prayer session 
held in her department at the Naval Supply Center. This EEOC opinion did not address 
the merits of the claim but whether the plaintiffs complaint could proceed after she had 
rejected a settlement offer. The opinion specifically stated that "nothing in this decision 
is intended to suggest that a one-time offer of a prayer at work .. would rise to the level 
of hostile environment harassment." !d. at *6. 
189. I drew my universe of cases from a "key search" I performed on Westlaw in 
November 2001. As my key terms, I selected first "employment law," then "discrimina-
tion," and then "harassment." On the "search page," I selected "US district court" cases. 
I then entered "sy,di(harassment) & date(>1998)" as my search terms. 
190. Temple v. Auto Bane of Kan., Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (D. Kan. 1999). 
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My review also revealed only two possible cases of "envi-
ronmental harassment" that survived defendants' motions for 
summary judgment between 1998 and 2001. In Underwood v. 
Northport Health Services, Inc., 191 a white plaintiff was ridiculed 
by African American coworkers and subordinates and falsely 
accused of being racist. Her employer ultimately demoted her 
because she had poor relationships with her coworkers. The 
court denied the employer summary judgment because the racial 
ridicule undermined the plaintiff's work and paved the way for 
her demotion. The plaintiff in LaRocca v. Precision Motorcars, 
Inc. 192 claimed that his coworkers created a hostile work envi-
ronment by denigrating his and others' national origin. The 
court denied the employer's summary judgment motion because 
the plaintiff was himself repeatedly insulted. These cases argua-
bly involved "direct" harassment, to use Professor Volokh's 
terminology, not "environmental" harassment, because the 
plaintiff was the subject of the "overheard" remarks. In the vast 
majority of the cases I reviewed, when a plaintiff complained of 
verbal harassment, district courts granted summary judgment for 
defendants, unless the plaintiff was also the victim of offensive 
touching or fondling or the subject of a pattern of frequent, tar-
geted, and repeated insults and verbal abuse. 193 
For the sake of argument, assume, as Professor Volokh 
does, that each individual photograph, cartoon, or scrawl at the 
Jacksonville Shipyard would ordinarily be protected by the First 
Amendment. The government, it is true, generally cannot ban or 
suppress the creation, distribution, display, or viewing of por-
nography unless it is obscene.194 Even so, a hostile work envi-
ronment claim based on the pervasive display of pornographic 
pictures, cartoons, and graffiti does not necessarily create a First 
Amendment problem. 
As an initial matter, offense is not harassment. One porno-
graphic image or an off-color joke does not by itself create a hos-
tile work environment. Harassment must be pervasive or severe 
to be actionable. To be severe or pervasive, harassment must be 
frequent, humiliating, physically threatening, or serious enough 
191. 57 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (M.D. Ala. 1999). 
192. 45 F. Supp. 2d 762 (D. Neb. 1999). 
193. Sec, e.g., Franklin v. King Lincoln-Mercury-Suzuki, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 661 (D. 
Md. 1999) (denying summary judgment for defendant on plaintiffs hostile work envi-
ronment claim because the plaintiff was nicknamed "M&M" (for "mental masturba-
tion"), subjected to lewd remarks ("why order out when you can have fresh meat here?'') 
and sexual gestures). 
194. Sable Communication. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
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that it actually interferes with someone's ability to do work. 195 
Harris v. Forklift squarely holds that: A "mere utterance of 
an ... epithet which engenders offensive feelings in a employee 
does not sufficient~ affect the conditions of employment to im-
plicate Title VII." 1 6 The Court expanded this point in Faragher 
v. City o~ Boca Raton197 and Clark County School District v. 
Breeden. 98 "A recurring point in [the Court's harassment] opin-
ions is that simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated inci-
dents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discrimina-
tory changes in the 'terms and conditions of employment.",~99 
It is true that in the harassment context, some courts have 
held that a supervisor can create an abusive work environment if 
he calls a subordinate a "n- -r."20° Courts facing such fact pat-
terns have not ruled uniformly, however. Courts have been sig-
nificantly less likely to hold that coworkers have created hostile 
and abusive work environments when they have called a fellow 
worker the same epithet or when the epithet was not directed at 
the plaintiff.201 Those cases that confront analogous gender-
specific epithets suggest that "n- -r" is the sole exception that 
proves the general rule. In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton/02 the 
I 95. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,23 (1993). 
I 96. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. Last year the Court reaffirmed this point in Clark 
County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam). In that case, Ms. Breeden 
complained to her employer that her coworkers harassed her during a meeting with her 
when they had laughed at a sexual insult that was recounted in a job applicant's file. Af-
ter she complained, her employer proposed transferring her to an undesirable job, in re-
taliation, she claimed, for her complaint. Id. at 271-73. The Court held that the incident 
could not create a hostile work environment, and that her belief that it was harassment 
was so off-base that Title VII did not shield her from retaliation. Id. at 270-71. 
197. 524 U.S. 775,788 (1998). 
I 98. 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam). 
I 99. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,788 (1998); Breeden, 532 U.S. 271. 
200. I trust the reader can mentally fill in the ellipses. Sec, e.g., Rodgers v. Western-
Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that supervisor had cre-
ated a hostile work environment by calling plaintiff "n- -r" on more than one occasion 
because "no single act can more quickly alter the conditions of employment and create 
an abusive working environment than the usc of an unambiguously racial epithet such as 
'n- -r' by a supervisor in the presence of his subordinates") (ellipses added); Walker v. 
Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 1982) ("[U]se of the terms 'n--r-
rigged' and 'black-ass,' as well as other racially abusive language was 'repeated,' 'con-
tinuous,' and 'prolonged' despite [plaintiffs] objections, and that the language made 
[plaintiff] feel unwanted and uncomfortable in his surroundings") (ellipses added); Bai-
ley v. Binyon, 583 F.Supp. 923, 927 (N.D. Ill.1984) ("The use of the word 'n- -r' auto-
matically separates the person addressed from every non-black person; this is discrimina-
tion per se") (ellipses added). 
201. See, e.g. Eruanga v. Grafton Sch., Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523-24 (D. Md. 
2002) (finding no hostile work environment when supervisors' use of word n--r was 
reported to plaintiff by others and not directly heard by him). 
202. 524 u.s. 775,788 (1998). 
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Supreme Court clarified that the hostile work environment did 
not prohibit "the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-
related jokes, [or] occasional teasing." Such "isolated incidents" 
do not create discriminatory "terms and conditions of employ-
ment."zo3 
Second, holding a defendant liable for harm caused by an 
entire course of conduct, though each isolated incident would 
not create liability, is not unique to the hostile work environ-
ment cause of action. The same logic underlies intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress claims: one insult almost never causes 
legally cognizable anguish, but many such slurs can.204 The First 
Amendment does not bar these claims. 
Critics might reply that the actual state of harassment law is 
beside the point if employers actually do squelch protected ex-
pression out of a fear of Title VII liability. Professor Volokh has 
documented that many employers zealously police their work-
places for offensive expression. It does not follow, however, that 
the hostile work environment cause of action is unconstitution-
ally vague. The next section argues that Title VII provides suffi-
cient guidance to employers and is not unconstitutionally vague. 
It is possible that employers might over-regulate employees' 
or patrons' expression out of an irrational fear of liability under 
Title VII. But employer over-regulation is only a constitutional 
concern if Title VII is itself unconstitutionally vague or over-
broad; or if workplace expression is so crucial to public discourse 
that a special rule to protect against erroneous hostile work en-
vironment judgments is necessary to ensure that all protected 
speech is insulated from liability. The New York Times actual 
malice requirement is this kind of rule, and it buffers speakers 
and publishers against defamation suits by public officials and 
figures. I will argue that such a rule might be appropriate in ex-
pressive workplaces to insulate them from environmental har-
assment claims based on patrons' expression or the overall mis-
sion of the workplace itself. Additionally, the likelihood that an 
employer will over-regulate expression in the workplace will 
vary depending on a workplace's mission. In workplaces that are 
most connected to public discourse-expressive workplaces and 
203. Id.; see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (holding that a 
"mere offensive utterance" is not severe or pervasive harassment). 
204. Sec McLure v. Tiller, 63 S.W.3d 72, 82 (Tex. App. 2001) ("Although a single 
act, taken alone, may or may not rise to the level of 'extreme and outrageous' conduct, 
this Court has previously determined that it is possible that several acts taken together 
can amount to such harassment as to be more than petty oppression"). 
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public accommodations such as restaurants, bars, and cafes-
employers have the fewest incentives to check patrons' expres-
sion. 
B. LEGAL UNCERTAINTY IS A FACf OF LIFE, EVEN UNDER 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The threat of liability almost always encourages actors to 
take steps to avoid it. Some employers wishing to avoid liability 
for discrimination will limit their employees' expression, possibly 
even more than the law requires, and perhaps because of uncer-
tainty about what the law requires. If true, this fact does not it-
self make antidiscrimination laws unconstitutional. To argue that 
uncertainty is unconstitutional, the free-speech attack has made 
three false assumptions. First, the free-speech attack assumes 
that the First Amendment always protects expression and always 
protects it in the same way, without regard to context or content. 
As we have seen, however, not all expression relates equally to 
the First Amendment. Second, the free-speech attack also as-
sumes that the First Amendment's concern with inhibiting ex-
pression is always the same regardless of the context in which 
expression occurs. This, too, is wrong. The First Amendment is 
far more worried about chilling effects in the arena of public dis-
course?05 Third, the free-speech attack has assumed that all em-
ployers would prefer to avoid the risk of hostile work environ-
ment liability by stifling expression in the workplace, auto-
dealerships the same as bookstores and art galleries. This as-
sumption is just silly. 
1. No one, not even The New York Times, is 
spared from legal uncertainty 
Legal uncertainty is a fact of life. The First Amendment 
does not spare newspapers, museums, libraries, book publishers, 
or speakers declaiming on public corners from legal uncer-
tainty.206 Speakers, writers, and publishers face potential liability 
every day, even when they are publishing stories that unques-
tionably address political matters. New York Times does not bar 
liability; it permits public officials and figures to recover for 
defamation if the defendant acted with "actual malice." "Actual 
malice" test is a term of art for recklessness-the defendant 
205. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53,55 (1988) (explaining that concerns 
about chill arc particularly acute "in the area of public debate about public figures"). 
206. Post, Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment at 9 (cited in note 15). 
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knew or should have known that a statement was false and pub-
lished despite that knowledge. This is a difficult but not insur-
mountable test. 
The "actual malice" standard does not apply to all cases. 
Private persons may recover against newspapers for defamation, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, false-light, or public 
disclosure of private facts, even if the newspaper was reporting 
on matters of public concern. If newspapers and magazines can 
publish and flourish in the face of potential liability, there is no 
reason to expect that expressive workplaces (which may include 
newspapers and magazines) would react differently to the (re-
mote) possibility of hostile work environment liability. 
Political speech is not completely immune from liability for 
defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress be-
cause the state has an interest in protecting personal reputations, 
even though doing so may impinge on "s~eech." As the Court 
explained in Milkovich v. Lorain Journae0 
The numerous decisions . . . establishing First Amendment 
protection for defendants in defamation actions surely dem-
onstrate the Court's recognition of the Amendment's vital 
guarantee of free and uninhibited discussion of public issues. 
But there is also another side to the equation; we have regu-
larly acknowledged the 'important social values which under-
lie the law of defamation,' and recognized that '[s]ociety has a 
pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing at-
tacks upon reputation.' ... 'The right of a man to the protec-
tion of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and 
wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the 
essential dignity and worth of every human being- a concept 
at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.'208 
New York Times and Hustler do not ban dignitary tort suits 
to save protected speech. Rather, they simply elevate the 
threshold for liability to shift the risk, or cost, of error involved 
in publishing potentially defamatory or otherwise tortious mate-
rial from the media to the defamed person.209 At common law, 
defamation was a strict liability tort; after these decisions recov-
ery for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress must satisfy a higher, constitutionally mandated standard 
for liability. 
207. 497 u.s. 1 (1990). 
208. Id. at 22-23. 
209. Sec Schauer, 92 Col urn. L. Rev. at 1321-23 (cited in note 67). 
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2. The legal standards for hostile work environ-
ment provide appropriate "breathing room" 
for expression in ordinary workplaces 
439 
Hostile work environment doctrine incorporates "breathing 
room" for employee and employer speech in a couple of ways 
that are similar to defamation's actual malice test. First, the 
standard for finding actionable harassment is relatively high. A 
plaintiff flattened by one callous or crude remark by a supervisor 
or coworker will not prevail.210 Harassment must be not only of-
fensive, but severe, repeated, and pervasive before a court will 
impose liability. Second, a plaintiff must also prove that an em-
ployer is liable for the harassment. Employers are vicariously li-
able only for harassment by supervisors. Even then, they may es-
cape liability if they provided adequate channels for reporting 
and remedying harassment, and the plaintiff unreasonably failed 
to avail herself of these opportunities.m 
Establishing employer liability for "environmental harass-
ment" and harassment by coworkers and third parties is signifi-
cantly more difficult. This fact is significant because critics have 
identified "environmental harassment" and harassment by co-
workers and third parties as presenting the greatest risk to free 
speech.212 The standard for employer liability in these cases is 
negligence-that the employer knew or should have known of 
the harassment and failed to take appropriate corrective ac-
tion.213 Put differently, "a victim of coworker harassment must 
show either actual knowledge on the part of the employer or 
conduct sufficiently severe and pervasive as to constitute con-
structive knowledge to the employer. "214 
In practice, courts require the plaintiff to notify the em-
ployer that she believes she is being harassed on the basis of sex 
or some other protected characteristic; notifying an employer 
that another coworker is generally harassing her is not 
enough.215 Absent notification, courts will find constructive 
knowledge only if harassment is public and constant, or if the 
acts of harassment are "so egregious, numerous, and concen-
210. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (an offensive epithet is not 
enough). 
211. Eller1h, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher v. Boca Rawn, 524 U.S. 775, 804-08 (1998). 
212. Vo1okh, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1845-47 (cited in note 28); Vo1okh, 85 George-
town L.J. at 635-36 (cited in note 178). 
2!3. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759. 
214. Miller v. Ken worth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F. 3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir. 2002). 
215. See, e.g., McGuire v. Kansas, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12973, *16-17 (D. Kan. 
2001). 
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trated" that they amount to a "a campaign."216 Occasionally, an 
employer may have constructive notice if it knows that a particu-
lar employee has repeatedly and seriously harassed others be-
fore.21 
A negligence standard for employer liability does falls short 
of the "actual malice" or recklessness standard of New York 
Times and Falwell. It is, however, not without fault. Also, in 
practice, courts tend to use more of a "negligence plus" stan-
dard, often refusing to find that the employer liable unless the 
complainant actually reported the harassment.218 
The effect of New York Times' recklessness standard is to 
"protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that mat-
ters."219 Applied to hostile work environment actions, such a 
standard would shield expression that would otherwise be severe 
and pervasive harassment to protect expression that matters. It 
has no place in ordinary workplaces. New York Times extends its 
special protection to select expression about ~ublic officials and 
figures within the realm of public discourse.22 But, as I have ar-
gued in Part I, expression in ordinary workplaces rarely if ever 
resembles expression within the realm of public discourse, where 
freewheeling debate is the ideal and the cure for offense is giving 
as good as you get. Communication among workers occurs 
among private persons, not public figures, and against the back-
drop of numerous restraints and civility norms-workers depend 
on one another and continuously interact in close quarters. 
We should also remember that the government has a com-
pelling interest in ensuring equal employment opportunities ir-
respective of race, sex, or national origin. Surely, if the govern-
ment's interest in protecting private individuals from 
reputational harm justifies a negligence standard for defamation 
suits, the government's interest in workplace equality justifies 
hostile work environment's similar liability standards. The gov-
216. Ford v. West, 222 F. 3d 767, 777 (lOth Cir. 2000); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
144 F.3d 664, 675 (lOth Cir.1998); Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1346 (lOth 
Cir. 1990); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1986). 
217. Ciszewski v. Engineered Polymers Corp., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1097-98 (D. 
Minn. 2001); sec also Hirase·Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 61 F.3d 777, 784 
(lOth Cir. 1995). 
218. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Macy's E., Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18684 (D. Me. 
2001) (finding that, based on the plaintiffs reports of sporadic harassment, the employer 
could not have expected that further harassment would occur). 
219. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,341 (1974). 
220. !d. at 347-48. 
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ernment's interest in workplace equality is at least as great as its 
interest in protecting individual reputation. 
Given these considerations, the actual malice standard's 
preference for free speech over other interests would be out of 
place in most workplaces. In ordinary workplaces, the hostile 
work environment's negligence standard strikes the right bal-
ance between the government's interest in promoting equal em-
ployment opportunities and employer prerogatives to manage 
workplaces and workforces.221 
3. Some expression in "communicative" workplaces deserves 
additional protection from hostile work environment liability 
Not all workplaces are ordinary workplaces. Some that I 
have called "communicative" or "expressive" generate expres-
sion that contributes to public discourse (such as museum exhib-
its and newspapers) or facilitate the public discourse of their pa-
trons (museums and libraries and perhaps restaurants). 
Employee suits for environmental harassment based on an or-
ganization's or its patrons' expression could suppress a great 
deal of public discourse. In these workplaces, the law should 
protect some harassment "to protect speech that matters. "222 If a 
worker in an expressive workplace were to bring a hostile envi-
ronment claim based on the theory that some expression linked 
to public discourse-a picture in a gallery or a patron's grue-
somely graphic discussion of the picture-New York Times' ac-
tual malice standard should apply. In effect, New York Times 
and Falwell would entirely bar most, if not all, claims of harass-
ment arising in this context, as they would be based on harassing 
expressions of opinion, not false facts. 
C. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT'S 
REASONABLE PERSON STANDARDS ARE NOT 
UN CONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, AND THEY 
MIRROR THE ELEMENTS OF OTHER DIGNITARY 
TORTS 
Critics have argued that hostile work environment's "rea-
sonable person" standard of abusiveness and its inquiry into a 
plaintiff's subjective reactions are unacceptably vague. These ob-
221. Cf. Post, Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment at 620 (cited in note 15) 
("(T]he value of equality presents stronger constitutional claims within the context of the 
workplace than within the context of public discourse."). 
222. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341. 
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jections are groundless. These elements of a hostile work envi-
ronment cause of action mirror those of other dignitary torts. 
The cause of action for hostile work environment generates no 
more legal uncertainty than do those torts. 
Several contextual inquiries underlie the absence of malice 
standard. Courts must determine whether a statement is defama-
tory, whether it is fact or opinion, and whether it is true or 
false. 223 To determine whether a statement is defamatory, courts 
ask whether statements in an article or speech, read "in context 
and looking at the impression that they were likely to engender in 
the minds of the_ aver,~?e reader" or listener, are "c~pa~le of a de-
famatory meamng. ,_ In other words, the question 1s whether 
the statements "lower[] the ... reputation" of some individual 
"in the eyes of the community," causing "others to avoid associ-
ating with" that person.225 Courts evaluate potentially defama-
tory statements "in the light of what might reasonably have been 
understood ... by the persons who [heard] it. "226 
Whether a potentially defamatory publication is fact or 
opinion also matters. Statements of opinion sometimes receive 
greater First Amendment protection. But the distinction be-
tween fact and opinion is not clear-cut. As with the inquiry into 
an article's defamatory impact, the distinction between fact and 
opinion turns on context and an ordinary reader's reactions. 
Would a reader understand a statement to be the writer's opin-
ion or a factual assertion? Whether a speaker or writer prefaced 
a statement with "I think" does not complete the inquiry, as 
Judge Henry Friendly once acidly observed.227 Instead courts 
223. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). 
224. E.g., Tucker v. Fischbein, 237 F.3d 275, 283 (3d Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) 
(applying Pennsylvania defamation law); see also Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 45 (West, 1982) 
(providing that "[l]ibel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing ... which ex-
poses any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be 
shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation"); Masson v. 
New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991) (observing that under California 
law "'[t]he test of libel is not quantitative; a single sentence may be the basis for an action 
in libel even though buried in a much longer text,' though California courts recognize 
that '[ w ]bile a drop of poison may be lethal, weaker poisons are sometimes diluted to the 
point of impotency"') (quoting Washburn v. Wright, 261 Cal. App. 2d 789, 795 (1968)); 
Bakal v. Weare, 583 A.2d 1028, 1029 (Me.l990) (explaining that under Maine law a 
statement is defamatory "'if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him 
in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing 
with him"') (quoting Restatement (2d) Torts§ 559 (1977)). 
225. Tucker, 237 F.3d at 283. 
226. Marston v. Newavom, 629 A.2d 587,592 (Me. 1993) (quotations omitted). 
227. "It would be destructive of the law of libel if a writer could escape liability for 
accusations of [defamatory conduct] simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the words 'I 
think."' Cianci v. New Times Pub/. Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoted in Milk-
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ask, among other questions, whether a speaker or writer employ 
"loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language which would negate 
the impression that [he] was seriously maintaining" a proposi-
tion?22 What was the general tenor of the article? Playful or 
deadly serious? 
The jury read as parody, not fact, Hustler's publication of 
Jerry Falwell's "confession" that his mother had deflowered him 
in the family outhouse and that he could preach the gospel only 
when he was stone-drunk. The "interview" appeared in a self-
proclaimed "ad-parody," with a small-print disclaimer that the 
ad was not meant to be taken seriously. The farcically worded 
"ad" also appeared in Hustler, a publication with which Falwell 
was unlikely to interview. No one could have taken it seriously. 
By contrast, the Court found the statements at issue in 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. to be largely factual.229 Mike 
Milkovich coached a high school wrestling team that was sus-
pended from the state wrestling tournament by the state athletic 
association for fighting with another team at a match. The wres-
tlers' parents sued to overturn the suspension, and Milkovich 
testified in that suit. The Lorain Journal published a column im-
plying that Milkovich had lied under oath. The columnist wrote 
conversationally and used the first-person to report his impres-
sions of Milkovich's testimony. The Court found that the gist of 
the column gleaned from the column's caption and body was 
that Milkovitch had '"lied at the hearing after ... having given 
his solemn oath to tell the truth. "'230 This accusation was a fac-
tual proposition-the writer did not use "the sort of loose, figu-
rative, or hyperbolic language" that "would negate the impres-
sion" that Milkovich had perjured himself.231 The implication 
"that petitioner committed perjury is sufficiently factual to be 
susceptible of being proved true or false. "232 Whether Milkovich 
perjured himself could be determined by examining "a core of 
objective evidence"-Milkovich's "testimony before the [state 
athletics 1 board [and] his subsequent testimony before the trial 
court."231 
ovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990)). 
228. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21. 
229. Id. at 21-22. 
230. Id. at 5. 
231. Id. at 21. 
232. Id. at 21. 
233. Id. at 21. 
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Determining the truth or falsity of defamatory statements 
also requires contextual judgment. For example, when Clint 
Eastwood sued the National Enquirer for touting its "interview" 
with Clint Eastwood as "exclusive" when Eastwood had never 
spoken to anyone at the Enquirer, the court took those facts as 
the starting point for its analysis.234 The Enquirer contended that 
in the tabloid trade the phrase "exclusive interview" meant only 
that the Enquirer was the sole American tabloid to run the in-
terview, not that it had actually interviewed Eastwood.235 The 
court, however, found that the article's use of the "simple past 
tense" ("Eastwood said") rather than the past perfect ("East-
wood has said") along with "scene-setting language" ("[East-
wood] said with a chuckle") "suggested that the writer," an En-
quirer editor, "had conversed" with "the movie star."236 The 
court concluded: 
We are not suggesting that any one of these things is disposi-
tive (or, conversely, that the Enquirer would have solved the 
problem with a single alteration). Rather, we look to the total-
ity of the Enquirer's presentation of the interview and find 
that the editors falsely suggested to the ordinary reader of 
their publication-as well as those who merely glance at the 
headlines while waiting at the supermarket checkout 
counter-that Eastwood had willingly chatted with someone 
f h E . 237 rom t e nqULrer. 
Here, too, the "ordinary reader's" reaction to all of the article's 
contextual clues-the headline, the "exclusive" baby picture of 
Eastwood's son that accompanied the article, and the verb tense 
used to relate Eastwood's remarks-is the judicial benchmark. 
Finally, when the plaintiff is a public figure or official, a de-
fendant's liability turns on the presence of "actual malice"-
"knowledge that [a statement] was false or with reckless disre-
gard of whether it was false or not."238 Sometimes tort liability 
for statements concerning matters of public interest is also 
evaluated under the actual malice standard. Who is a public fiR-
ure239 and whether a statement is a matter of public concern ° 
are also fact- and context-based questions. 
234. Eastwood v. Nat'/ Enquirer, Inc., 123 F.3d 1249, 1255-56 (9th Cir. 1997). 
235. Id. at 1256. 
236. Id. at 1250, 1256. 
237. Id. at 1256 (emphasis added). See also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 
501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991) ("Minor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as the sub-
stance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be justified."). 
238. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279-280 (1964). 
239. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (holding public figure 
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Unsurprisingly, the inquiry into "malice" also requires con-
textual analysis- did "the author in fact entertain[] serious 
doubts as to the truth of his publication or actiJ with a high de-
gree of awareness of ... [its] probable falsity"? 1 Faced with the 
seemingly simple case of quotation marks deliberately placed 
around words the plaintiff never spoke, Masson v. New Yorker 
Magazine rejected a per se finding of malice or recklessness: 
[The] deliberate alteration of the words uttered by a plaintiff 
does not equate with knowledge of falsity for purposes of 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc. unless the alteration results in a material change in the 
meaning conveyed by the statement. The use of quotations to 
attribute words not in fact spoken bears in a most important 
way on that inquiry, but it is not dispositive in every case. 242 
Instead the Court's inquiry proceeded in three steps. First, 
would "a reasonable reader ... conclude that the quotation pur-
ports to be a verbatim repetition of a statement by the speaker"? 
Second, did the quotation differ materially from what the person 
actually said? Third, did the writer recklessly change the mean-
ing of the quotations?243 
The Court dissected each quotation in Malcolm's New 
Yorker article against Masson's remarks on tape, painstakingly 
comparing the fair reading of Masson's tape-recorded statements 
with Malcolm's quotations?44 The Court analyzed, for example, 
whether Malcolm's quotation that Masson planned to use the 
Freud house for "sex, women, fun" differed substantially from 
Masson's tape-recorded remarks that "he and another analyst 
planned to have great parties at the Freud house and, in a con-
text that may not even refer to Freud house activities, to 'pass 
women on to each other"'; or whether Malcolm's quote that 
Masson had changed his middle-name to Moussaieff because "it 
sounded better" was "in context" materially different from Mas-
inquiry asks whether person has "assume[dj special prominence in the resolution of pub-
lic questions"). 
240. Cf. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983) (holding in the government 
employee speech context that "whether ... speech addresses a matter of public concern 
must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed 
by the whole record"). 
241. Masson, 501 U.S. at 510 (citations omitted). 
242. Id. at 517 (citations omitted). 
243. !d. at 519-20. 
244. Id. at 522 (asking whether quotations "fairly read" differed materially from 
tape-recorded remarks). 
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son's tape-recorded explanation that he "just liked" the name 
better.24 
The Court also scrutinized the particular factual circum-
stances surrounding Malcolm's drafting of the article and the 
New Yorker's publication of it to determine whether there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to consider the issue of malice. 
Noting that Malcolm had taped the interviews and that she was 
not working under a "tight deadline," the Court concluded that 
she had enough time to compare her quotes against the tapes for 
accuracy.Z46 She had also told her New Yorker editor that all of 
the story's quotations came from the tapes, and a comparison of 
her "typewritten notes, ... manuscript, [and] ... galler,s" tended 
to show that she knew she was altering the quotations. 47 
The factual and contextual issues underpinning a defama-
tion case closely resemble those in hostile work environment 
suits. Both causes of action rest on the reactions of a "reason-
able" person. Defamation asks how a reasonable person would 
have understood a statement and whether such a person's esti-
mation of the plaintiff would drop. Hostile work environment 
asks whether a reasonable person would find the work environ-
ment to be "hostile and abusive."248 Both dissect the context in 
which the statements were made. In defamation courts analyze 
the publication in which the statement appears,249 the context of 
the statement within the story, and whether the statement would 
be understood as ironic or as hyperbole. In hostile work envi-
ronment cases, courts consider "all [of] the circumstances. "250 
Among many considerations, the court may analyze what a co-
worker or supervisor said or did to the plaintiff, whether the ha-
rasser was a supervisor or coworker, whether the comments 
were frequent or sporadic, whether they were made jokingly or 
with a threatening or humiliating tone, or whether they were 
said in private or in front of other workers. 
245. !d. at 523-24 (internal quotations omitted). 
246. !d. at 521. 
247. !d. 
248. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993). Hostile work environment 
additionally requires that the plaintiff subjectively finds her work environment to be hos-
tile and abusive. 
249. For example, someone reading a story in the New Yorker would probably un-
derstand quotation marks to designate the actual words of the person quoted. See, e.g., 
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 513 (1991). By contrast, someone 
reading the National Enquirer likely takes quotation marks with a grain of salt. See, e.g., 
Eastwood v. National Enquirer, 123 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1997). 
250. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. 
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In evaluating an employer's liability for harassment by a 
plaintiff's coworkers, courts use a standard that parallels the 
"absence of malice" standard for liability. Employer liability for 
coworker harassment turns on whether the employer knew or 
should have known that the plaintiff was being harassed and 
whether the employer failed to take appropriate corrective ac-
tion.251 
Some commentators have argued that the hostile work en-
vironment cause of action is constitutionally suspect because it 
depends on the "reactions of listeners" and therefore violates 
the constitutional maxim against the "heckler's veto." This criti-
cism is a non sequitur. The plaintiff's subjective reaction is an 
additional element of the hostile work environment, not the 
threshold. The threshold requirement is whether a reasonable 
person would find the workplace hostile and abusive-just as a 
statement is defamatory if it casts a person in disrepute in the 
eyes of an average or reasonable reader. If a plaintiff subjec-
tively perceives her workplace as hostile or abusive, her com-
plaint will nevertheless fail if a reasonable person would not find 
the workplace to be so. On the other hand, a plaintiff's com-
plaint will fail if she cannot prove that she perceived her work-
place to be hostile or abusive, even if it objectively is so. 
Reliance on a "reasonable person" standard to determine 
whether a work environment is hostile or abusive could be de-
scribed as a "listener-reaction" standard. But the use of the "rea-
sonable person" standard to determine hostile work environ-
ment is no different in this respect from defamation, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and other personality torts such 
as public disclosure of private facts.252 Each of these torts uses a 
"reasonable" person or reader standard to determine offensive-
ness and the effect of a publication on a plaintiff's community 
standing. 
D. EMPLOYERS IN COMMUNICATIVE WORKPLACES AND IN 
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS HAVE FEW INCENTIVES TO 
SQUELCH THEIR PATRONS' EXPRESSION 
The previous sections demonstrate that Title VII's liability 
standards are quite similar to the liability standards that govern 
251. Burlington Indus .• Inc. v. E//erth, 524 U.S. 742,758-59 (1998). 
252. See, e.g., Flowers v. Carville, 112 F. Supp.2d 1202 (D. Nev., 2000) (holding that 
standard for recovery for public disclosure of private facts is whether "a public disclosure 
of pnvate facts has occurred which would be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibilities") (quotations omitted). 
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defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
There is no conceptual reason, therefore, that Title VII should 
create a greater risk of chill than these reputational torts do. 
There are practical reasons as well why employers in "ex-
pressive" or "communicative" workplaces are unlikely to over-
react to the risk of Title VII liability. The argument that em-
ployers will censor workplace expression is straightforward: 
Profit-maximizing employers see the risk of Title VII liability as 
a cost to be avoided, and censoring workplace expression is a 
cheap way to avoid liability. This argument, however, assumes 
that all employers share the same inclinations to steer far clear 
of Title VII liability by curbing expression in the workplace. But 
that is not the case. Indeed, employers in workplaces with the 
closest connection to public discourse have the weakest incen-
tives to overreact to the threat of liability. Employers in "expres-
sive workplaces" -museums and libraries, for example-and in 
public accommodations, such as restaurants, bars, and cafes, 
have little if any incentive to over-regulate patrons' expression 
to avoid the risk of liability. No rational business or organization 
that devotes itself to public discourse or that provides a place for 
people to socialize would censor its patrons' speech, because it 
would defeat the organization's reason for existence. 
Let's begin with expressive workplaces. Many organizations 
maximize something other than profit. A successful museum, for 
example, attracts a lot of patrons and expands its donor base so 
that it can expand its collection and stage larger and more elabo-
rate exhibits (which in turn attracts more patrons and more do-
nations). A museum will only succeed if it caters to its patrons 
by making the museum a fun and exciting place for them to 
learn and talk about art, history, or science. Actively policing pa-
trons' expression or staging only the most inoffensive exhibits 
vitiates these goals. 
Much the same can be said about libraries. A good library 
has lots of patrons as well as lots of books. Libraries attract pa-
trons by providing materials on a wide range of topics and by 
providing a pleasant place to think, read, and do research. Moni-
toring the materials that patrons use and read impedes those 
purposes. Significantly, Title VII liability was not enough to 
make the Minneapolis Library monitor and restrict patrons' 
Internet access, though librarians did claim harassment. The li-
brary brushed off the librarians' complaints because of its insti-
tutional commitment to free access to information. The Minnea-
polis Library's stance is not unusual: the American Library 
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Association has consistently fought governmental restrictions on 
patrons' free access to information, most recently, federal re-
quirements that libraries install Internet filters as a condition of 
government funding. 253 Expressive workplaces that are profit-
maximizing-art galleries or commercial movie theaters, for ex-
ample-have similar incentives. Their ability to turn a profit de-
pends on the expression they sell, and they are unlikely to 
change that expression because an employee might find it offen-
sive. 
Public accommodations like bars and restaurants may not 
have the same institutional commitment to public discourse that 
expressive workplaces do. But they still have little economic 
incentive to overreact to the risk of harassment liability by 
policing the politeness of patrons' banter. People go to 
restaurants, bars, and cafes rather than ordering take out or 
having a glass of wine or cup of coffee at home because 
restaurants, bars, and cafes are fun places to hang out, talk with 
your friends, and people watch. It is hard to imagine that a 
restaurant would give a customer the boot because a waitress 
was offended by a conversation she overheard, unless perhaps, 
the waitress overheard a customer make an extremely crude 
remark about her. Hooters, to take an extreme example, 
strenuously defended its policy of hiring only women for its 
"front of the restaurant" positions against a class-action, sex 
discrimination suit. Hooters thought that male wait staff would 
have destroyed its restaurants' "t and a" atmosphere.254 Hooters 
refused to back down, and it settled the suit only after the 
plaintiffs agreed that being a woman was a bona fide 
253. See, e.g., Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United Srates, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9537 
(E.D. Pa. May 31, 2002) (striking on First Amendment grounds the Children's Internet 
Protection Act requirement that federally funded public libraries use Internet filters that 
exclude access to pornographic web sites). The American Library Association also 
fought the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which had sought to limit minors' ac-
cess to "indecent" materials on the Internet. See Am. Civil Libenies Union v. Reno, 929 
F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking Act as a violation of the 
First Amendment). 
254. See Martha Carr, Hooters Girls serve up lawsuits; Tavern accused of pregnancy 
bias, Times Picayune Sec. MONEY at 1 (October 22, 2000) ("Atlanta-based Hooters of 
America paid $3.75 million to settle a sexual discrimination case that claimed men were 
denied jobs as waiters. Hooters' defense was that the primary function of its waitresses 
was not food service but 'providing vicarious sexual recreation.' In exchange for the pay· 
ment, Hooters was granted by court order a Bonafide Occupational Qualification that 
allows the company to hire only female waitresses"); Area Hooters franchisee sued; Har· 
assment allegations isolated, firm says of ex-waitresses' case among Hooters' past legal 
troubles, Dallas Morning News 2F (Mar. 31, 2001) (reporting that Hooters "has made a 
niche for itself using scantily clad 'Hooters Girls' to serve chicken wings and burgers to 
its mostly male customers. The chain features a girl of the week on its Web site and un-
abashedly declares, 'Sex appeal is legal and it sells.'"). 
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fide occupational qualification for waiting on customers at 
Hooters. If a class-action BFOQ suit did not faze Hooters, an 
individual hostile work environment suit is unlikely to. 
Though Hooters might be an extreme example, it illustrates 
my general point. Customers are restaurants' bread and butter, if 
you will. Public accommodations that serve the public by provid-
ing a place to talk and relax are unlikely to react out of propor-
tion to the risk of potential harassment liability. 
It is true that employers in ordinary workplaces are more 
likely to over-react to the threat of hostile work environment li-
ability. But even here, the chill argument is overblown. Ordinary 
workplaces can be sufficiently invested in old, comfortable ways 
that they resist and resent having to change a workplace envi-
ronment. Even after Robinson and Harris, some formerly all-
male workplaces have balked at taking down girlie-posters and 
stopping sexual horseplay. 255 Moreover, the connection between 
workplace expression and public discourse is far more tenuous 
in ordinary workplaces, and so the damage done by overzealous 
employers is slight. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Legal uncertainty does not itself unconstitutionally inhibit 
speech. A certain level of uncertainty is a fact of life for all par-
ticipants in public discourse. Employers do face some legal un-
certainty with regard to liability for workplace harassment 
(though courts have offered more guidance on this point than 
critics realize or admit). Not all employers will react identically 
to the threat of liability. Employers have varying incentives to 
promote or restrict expression depending on the workplace's 
mission and values. Furthermore, hostile work environment's 
doctrinal vagueness is comparable to the vagueness that accom-
panies the doctrines underlying dignitary torts and their rela-
tionship to the First Amendment. 
In ordinary workplaces, the negligence standard for em-
ployer liability for hostile work environments created by co-
workers and for environmental harassment strikes an appropri-
255. See, e.g., O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding a 
hostile work environment in a fire department where firefighters posted pornography 
and viewed pornographic films in violation of fire department policy but with the tacit 
approval of department superiors, and in the face of complaints by a woman firefighter); 
Petrosky v. N.Y. State DMV, 72 F. Supp. 2d 39,45 (N.D. N.Y. 1999) (noting that when 
plaintiff was hired, supervisor reportedly told her she would just have to tolerate her co-
workers' foul language). 
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ate balance between workplace expression and the important 
government interest in ensuring equal employment opportuni-
ties. There is a more substantial risk within communicative 
workplaces that environmental harassment suits claiming har-
assment due to an organization's or its patrons' expression could 
squelch a great deal of public discourse. In environmental har-
assment cases arising in this context, courts should scrutinize 
whether the expression at issue touches on matters of public 
concern and is related to the organization's expressive mission. 
If the answer to these questions is yes, Falwell protects employ-
ers from liability. 
III. ABANDONING THE QUIXOTIC QUEST FOR 
BRIGHT LINES 
No bright-line rule dictates what is and what is not pro-
tected speech in the workplace, and the validity of First 
Amendment objections to hostile work environment claims de-
pends wholly on workplace context. Workplaces have varying 
missions. That fact affects how workers encounter expression 
within the workplace, which in turn affects whether such expres-
sion merits First Amendment protection. In other First Amend-
ment areas, the Supreme Court has closely examined context 
and the speakers' and recipients' orientation toward speech. 
Courts reviewing hostile work environment causes of action 
should do the same. 
"Communicative" workplaces, which are organized around 
producing or supporting expression that is part of public dis-
course, must be distinguished from workplaces that provide ser-
vices or manufacture products outside the First Amendment's 
ambit. In communicative workplaces, expression that relates to 
the communicative mission of that workplace will often merit 
First Amendment protection from hostile work environment 
suits. 
Some expression in "communicative" workplaces should be 
treated differently under the First Amendment than expression 
in "ordinary" workplaces. A museum deserves First Amend-
ment protection against hostile work environment suits claiming 
that the museum's exhibits constitute harassment or that pa-
trons' speech about the exhibits constitute "environmental" har-
assment. Similarly, a writer for Hustler should not be able to 
claim that Hustler's content or discussions about the magazine's 
editorial decisions are harassing. A contrary rule would constrict 
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important arenas for public discourse. On the other hand, a hos-
tile work environment claim based on harassment by coworkers 
that is unrelated to the communicative mission of the workplace 
poses few First Amendment worries. Similarly, harassment 
claims in ordinary workplaces that arise out of direct communi-
cations among supervisors and subordinates pose few if any First 
Amendment problems. The same is true for harassment claims 
based on direct interactions among coworkers in ordinary work-
places. 
Critics' attacks on hostile work environment harassment 
have been premised on an overly simplistic view of when, why, 
and how the First Amendment protects expression. Ali-or-
nothing assertions about the protected or unprotected status of 
workplace speech will not produce useful doctrine. A successful 
defense of the hostile work environment cause of action must 
avoid the same pitfalls. Both sides must abandon quixotic aspira-
tions for bright-line rules in this area of law. 
Abandoning the search for bright-line rules does not itself 
imperil free speech. Rumors that the hostile work environment 
cause of action and other contextual inquiries unconstitutionally 
chill workplace speech are greatly exaggerated. Critics overstate 
the risk that employers will react to the threat of liability for hos-
tile work environment by restricting speech. Workplaces do not 
have identical incentives to limit speech; communicative work-
places have little incentive to undermine their very mission of 
generating expression. Moreover, the standards for hostile work 
environment liability- both the "reasonable" person standard 
for determining whether harassment exists and the standards for 
employer liability-mirror those of dignitary torts. These stan-
dards are completely consistent with New York Times and sub-
sequent cases. 
Abandoning the quest for bright-line rules permits scrutiny 
of the actual speech issues involved in harassment cases. Refus-
ing to acknowledge that First Amendment protection depends 
on culture and context, not bright-line rules, impoverishes our 
understanding of the First Amendment and leaves us unpre-
pared to meet the challenges of freedom of expression in our so-
ciety. 
